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ABSTRACT 
 
Quantitative Transportation Risk Analysis Based on Available Data/Databases: Decision 
Support Tools for Hazardous Materials Transportation. (May 2006) 
Yuanhua Qiao, B.En., Tianjin University, Tianjin, China; 
M.S, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
Historical evidence has shown that incidents due to hazardous materials 
(HazMat) releases during transportation can lead to severe consequences. The public and 
some agencies such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) show an increasing 
concern with the hazard associated with HazMat transportation. Many hazards may be 
identified and controlled or eliminated through use of risk analysis. Transportation Risk 
Analysis (TRA) is a powerful tool in HazMat transportation decision support system. It 
is helpful in choosing among alternate routes by providing information on risks 
associated with each route, and in selecting appropriate risk reduction alternatives by 
demonstrating the effectiveness of various alternatives.  
Some methodologies have been developed to assess the transportation risk; 
however, most of those proposed methodologies are hard to employ directly by decision 
or policy makers. One major barrier is the lack of the match between available 
data/database analysis and the numerical methodologies for TRA.  
 iv
In this work methodologies to assess the transportation risk are developed based 
on the availability of data or databases. The match between the availability of 
data/databases and numerical TRA methodologies is pursued. Each risk component, 
including frequency, release scenario, and consequence, is assessed based on the 
available data/databases. The risk is measured by numerical algorithms step by step in 
the transportation network. Based on the TRA results, decisions on HazMat 
transportation could be made appropriately and reasonably.  
The combination of recent interest in expanding or building new facilities to 
receive liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, along with increased awareness and 
concern about potential terrorist action, has raised questions about the potential 
consequences of incidents involving LNG transportation. One of those consequences, 
rapid phase transition (RPT), is studied in this dissertation. The incidents and 
experiments of LNG-water RPT and theoretical analysis about RPT mechanism are 
reviewed. Some other consequences, like pool spread and vapor cloud dispersion, are 
analyzed by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) model.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
  
Many conveniences taken for granted in modern civilization depend in part on 
HazMat. These materials must be transported from producers to end users, which creates 
opportunities for incidents (e.g., traffic incidents, train derailments, equipment failures) 
that could release hazardous chemicals into the environment. The adverse impact could 
occur when HazMat are released to the environment, including personal injury, property 
damage, and environmental contamination. 
Risk is defined as a measure of human injury, environmental damage, or 
economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or 
injury (CCPS, 2000). To reduce the adverse impact associated with the HazMat 
transportation, it is important to assess the risk at first, and then it is necessary to develop 
management systems that involve procedures and actions to support strategic, tactical 
and operational decisions, including the transportation route selection, facility selection, 
emergency response in case an incident would occur, and so on and so forth. These 
systems can also be called decision support systems for HazMat transportation. The 
analysis on the transportation risk is the foundation of the decision support system. 
 
                                                 
 This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries. 
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In this chapter the definition of HazMat will be introduced followed by the status 
of the HazMat transportation and the regulations on HazMat transportation in the U. S. 
Then the introduction on the techniques and concerns of TRA will be provided in 
comparison with the chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA).  The 
objectives and scope of our research will be presented to define the boundaries of our 
work.  
 
1.1. Hazardous Materials Transportation 
1.1.1. Hazardous Materials 
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 (49 CFR), Transportation, 
Part 171.8, HazMat is defined as a substance or material, including a hazardous 
substance, which has been determined by the Secretary of Transportation to be capable 
of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in 
commerce, and has designated as hazardous under section 5103 of Federal HazMat 
transportation law (OHMS, 2005a). More than 3300 substances and their products have 
been characterized as HazMat, including flammable, corrosive, radioactive, toxic, 
poisonous, and explosive substances. In 49 CFR, HazMat are separated into the 
following classes: 
• Class 1 – Explosives 
• Class 2 – Gases 
• Class 3 – Flammable liquids (and combustible liquids) 
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• Class 4 – Flammable solids; spontaneously combustible materials and dangerous                    
when wet materials  
• Class 5 – Oxidizers and organic peroxides  
• Class 6 – Toxic (poison) materials and infectious substances  
• Class 7 – Radioactive materials 
• Class 8 – Corrosive materials 
• Class 9 – Miscellaneous dangerous materials 
 
The majority of classes are segmented into divisions. This finer categorization of 
HazMat is very helpful for purposes of comparing risks. For example, Explosives in 
Class 1 are divided into six divisions, and risk associated with different divisions should 
be much more different with those within one division. Table 1.1 lists all the class 
numbers, division numbers, class or division names and 49 CFR sections which contain 
definitions for classifying hazardous materials. 
In subpart B of 49 CFR 171.1, the HazMat table designates the materials listed as 
HazMat for the purpose of transportation of those materials. For each listed material, the 
table identifies the hazard class, and gives the proper shipping name or directs the user to 
the preferred proper shipping name. In addition, the table specifies or references 
requirements in this subchapter pertaining to labeling, packaging, quantity limits aboard 
aircraft, and stowage of hazardous materials aboard vessels. 
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Table 1.1 
Hazardous materials classes and index to 49 CFR hazard class definitions 
Class 
No.  
Division 
No.  
Name of class or division  
49 CFR 
reference for 
definitions  
1  1.1  Explosives (with a mass explosion hazard)  173.50  
1  1.2  Explosives (with a projection hazard)  173.50  
1  1.3  Explosives (with predominately a fire hazard) 173.50  
1  1.4  Explosives (with no significant blast hazard)  173.50  
1  1.5  Very insensitive explosives; blasting agents  173.50  
1  1.6  Extremely insensitive detonating substances  173.50  
2  2.1  Flammable gas  173.115  
2  2.2  Non-flammable compressed gas  173.115  
2  2.3  Poisonous gas  173.115  
3   Flammable and combustible liquid  173.120  
4  4.1  Flammable solid  173.124  
4  4.2  Spontaneously combustible material  173.124  
4  4.3  Dangerous when wet material  173.124  
5  5.1  Oxidizer  173.127  
5  5.2  Organic peroxide  173.128  
6  6.1  Poisonous materials  173.132  
6  6.2  Infectious substance (Etiologic agent)  173.134  
7   Radioactive material  173.403  
8   Corrosive material  173.136  
9   Miscellaneous hazardous material  173.140  
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1.1.2. HazMat Transportation Incidents 
As detailed in the HazMat Shipments report from the Office of Hazardous 
Materials Safety (OHMS, 2005a), hazardous materials traffic levels in the U. S. now 
exceed 800,000 shipments per day and result in the transport of more than 3.1 billion 
tons of hazardous materials annually (OHMS, 2005b). 
According to the DOT statistics, 156,483 HazMat transportation incidents 
occurred from 1995 to 2004, resulting in a total of 226 fatalities and 3,218 injuries (US 
DOT, 2005). The detailed statistics for different transportation modes within that period 
are shown in Table 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows the tendency of the number of reported 
HazMat incidents from 1983 to 2004.  
 
 
Table 1.2 
HazMat transportation incidents, fatalities, injuries, and damages from 1995 to 2004 
Transportation mode Incidents Fatalities Injury Damages 
Air 10,721 110 157 2,055,546 
Highway 135,849 107 1,684 370,135,350 
Railway  9,813 9 1,375 154,493,434 
Water 100 0 2 3,873,145 
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Figure 1.1. Reported hazardous materials incidents.  
(OHMS, 2005c) 
 
1.1.3. HazMat Transportation Regulations 
The regulations that govern the transportation of HazMat have evolved over a 
period of more than 100 years (US DOT, 1998). The earliest regulation was promulgated 
in 1886 in response to turmoil within the railroad industry by the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.  
On January 3, 1975, the HazMat Transportation Act (HMTA), Title I of Public 
Law 93-633, was signed into law. The Act provided authority for the Secretary of 
Transportation to draw together previously fragmented regulatory and enforcement 
authority over the movement of HazMat in commerce into one consolidated and 
 7
coordinated effort. The HMTA was significantly amended by the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (HMTUSA), Public Law 101-615, signed on 
November 16, 1990, and codified in 1994 in 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127.  
A number of other authorities underlie DOT's regulation of HazMat 
transportation: the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972; the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976; the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980; and the Sanitary Food 
Transportation Act of 1990. Both HMTUSA and the HazMat Transportation 
Authorization Act of 1994 imposed on DOT additional responsibilities not codified in 
the Federal hazmat law. These laws have influenced and will continue to greatly 
influence the HazMat programs of all the modal administrations. 
Currently, the HazMat regulations are codified in 49 CFR Parts 100-185. Those 
regulations set forth standards applicable to HazMat transportation, which include 
classification, packaging, hazard communication, emergency response information, 
training of hazmat employees, handling, and incident reporting.  
In assessing the need for changes to the regulations, the Research and Special 
Programs Administration under DOT continuously monitors domestic transportation 
practices and experience and international regulatory developments. It evaluates requests 
for new or amended regulations received from the general public, the regulated industry, 
other Government agencies, and DOT's modal administrations. It also issues 
amendments to address specific safety problems, to incorporate new technology, and to 
respond to congressional mandates or executive orders.   
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1.2. Transportation Risk Analysis 
1.2.1. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) Methods 
The techniques of chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) are much 
better known than those of TRA, and there are many similarities in those two areas, so 
the techniques of CPQRA will be introduced first for better understanding of TRA.  
CPQRA is a methodology designed to provide management with a tool to help 
evaluate overall process safety in the chemical process industry (CCPS, 2000). 
Management systems such as engineering codes, checklists and process safety 
management (PSM) provide layers of protection against incidents. However, the 
potential for serious incidents cannot be totally eliminated. CPQRA provides a 
quantitative method to evaluate risk and to identify areas for cost-effective risk reduction. 
Many hazards may be identified and controlled or eliminated through the use of 
qualitative hazard analysis. Qualitative studies typically identify potentially hazardous 
events and their causes. In some cases, where the risks are clearly excessive and the 
existing safeguards are inadequate, corrective actions can be adequately identified with 
qualitative methods. QRA is used to help evaluate potential risks when qualitative 
methods cannot provide adequate understanding of the risks and more information is 
needed for risk management. It can also be used to evaluate alternative risk reduction 
strategies. The basis of QRA is to identify incident scenarios and evaluate the risk by 
defining the probability of failure, the probability of various consequences and the 
potential impact of those consequences. The risk is defined in CPQRA as a function of 
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probability or frequency and consequence of a particular incident scenario: 
Risk = F(s, c, f ) (1.1) 
Where,  
s = hypothetical scenario 
c = estimated consequence(s) 
f = estimated frequency 
 
This function can be extremely complex and there can be many numerically 
different risk measures (using different risk functions) calculated from a given set of s, c, 
f.  
 
1.2.2 Framework of TRA 
TRA methodologies have existed for about the same time period as have CPQRA 
methodologies, yet they are far less widely used and understood. TRA draws on many of 
the same tools and techniques as does CPQRA, but distribution activities are often 
performed in separate parts of an organization and may not be aware of all the internal 
resources available in risk analysis.  
TRA can be conducted on a qualitative or quantitative basis. Qualitative 
approaches include risk screening methodologies, which are generally unique for each 
company. Other qualitative approaches include carrier screening programs, route and 
container selection, and driver training and selection programs. The quantitative 
approach in TRA is similar to CPQRA, which is used to help evaluate potential risks 
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when qualitative methods cannot provide adequate understanding of the risks. It can also 
be used to evaluate alternative risk reduction strategies. The general steps of TRA are 
described below: 
• TRA Scope Definition converts user requirements into study goals and 
objectives. Risk measures and risk presentation formats are chosen in finalizing a 
scope of work for the TRA. A depth of study is then selected based on the 
specific objectives defined and the resources available.  
• Shipment Description is the compilation of the transportation activity 
information needed for the risk analysis. For example, mode, container 
specification, weather data, number of trips, volume per container, material, 
shipping conditions, route or origin and destination, and population data. This 
data set is then used throughout the TRA. 
• Hazard or Initiating Event Identification is a critical step in TRA. The 
incident-initiated events of concern can generally be identified based on 
historical data. Non-incident-initiated events may be identified through hazard 
identification techniques described in CPQRA Guidelines (CCPS, 2000). 
• Likelihood Estimation is the methodology used to estimate the frequency or 
probability of occurrence of an incident. Estimates may be obtained from 
historical incident data on failure frequencies, from failure sequence models such 
as fault trees and event trees or from special failure models. 
• Consequence Estimation is the methodology used to determine the potential for 
damage or injury from specific incidents. A single incident (e.g., rupture of a 
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pressurized liquid tank) can have many distinct incident outcomes, e.g., vapor 
cloud explosion (VCE), boiling liquid and so on.  
• Risk Estimation combines the consequences and likelihood of all incident 
outcomes from all selected incidents to provide a measure of risk. The risks of all 
selected incidents are individually estimated and summed to give an overall 
measure of risk.  
• Utilization of Risk Estimates is the process by which the results of a risk 
analysis are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk 
reduction strategies or through comparison with specific risk targets.  
 
In a screening or other qualitative analysis many of these steps are not carried out 
explicitly. Risk screens may be developed to implicitly take one or more of these steps 
into account. A screening level analysis can even be conducted by comparing the data 
set for the shipment of concern with the data set and results for another shipment for 
which a quantitative TRA has been conducted, and simply determining if the shipment 
of concern poses more or less risk than the previously evaluated one. In quantitative risk 
analyses it may be possible to take the results of other studies and use them as the basis 
of one or more of the steps in the TRA, but these other results may first need to be scaled 
or adjusted before using them, and usually all steps need to be performed to get the 
quantitative results.   
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1.2.3 Similarities to Fixed Facility Evaluations 
There are both similarities and differences between transportation and fixed 
facility risk evaluations. As stated herein, the general process of a quantitative TRA 
involves: defining the scope of the analysis, describing the system or movement, 
identifying hazards or initiating events (accident and non-accident), numerating 
incidents, selecting incidents, incident outcomes, and incident outcome cases, estimating 
consequences, estimating frequencies, combining frequencies and consequences to 
estimate risk, and evaluating risk reduction alternatives. These steps are virtually the 
same as in a CPQRA, but there are subtleties within each step. Some of the differences 
are listed in the guidelines compiled by CCPS (1995). Both TRA and fixed facility risk 
evaluations can be qualitative or semi-quantitative as opposed to quantitative. In these 
cases, many of these steps are handled on a comparative basis or addressed in much less 
detail. 
Qualitative or semi-quantitative estimates of risk generally take into account 
experience, judgment, good practices, training, procedures, inspection and maintenance, 
codes and standards, past performance, etc., whether one is dealing with fixed facilities 
or transportation movements. 
The modeling of release consequences is largely independent of the cause of the 
release and is therefore basically directly transferable from the techniques of CPQRA to 
TRA. Risk measures are also common to the two types of quantitative risk analyses. The 
only real differences are in the details of how the risks are estimated and the units chosen. 
For example, in transportation one may wish to measure risk per trip or risk per year (or 
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both), while in CPQRA risks are generally measured on a per year basis or on a 
comparative basis with other results.  
 
1.2.4. Differences from Fixed Facility Evaluations 
The most fundamental difference between CPQRA and TRA is that TRA deals 
with a linear source of risk, versus a relatively discrete point source for a CPQRA. This 
linear source may be static as in the case of pipelines or may be a moving source for 
other modes of transport. In transportation, a release can occur anywhere along a route 
between the origin and destination. The unpredictability of the exact release location 
often requires the use of generalized approaches to limit the data needs and number of 
incident outcome cases. These generalized approaches may relate to one or more of the 
following: 
• Identification and selection of initiating events – may utilize an aggregate 
incident rate or a limited breakdown, such as derailments and collisions, rather 
than a detailed breakout by failure mode. 
• Selection of incidents and incident outcomes – particularly release sizes and 
rates, release orientation, material temperature and pressure at time of release. 
While a release in a facility is reasonably predictable in terms of the material 
conditions, these could change with the seasons for many HazMat transportations, 
and even from one end of a route to another. 
• Meteorological conditions for modeling – wind roses and stability class 
distributions vary from location to location, as does the ambient temperature and 
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humidity. 
• Ignition probabilities – the number, type, and proximity of ignition sources vary 
along a route, and it may be very difficult to get route specific data. 
• Population distribution – not only is there usually very little, if any, buffer 
distance between a route and the general population, but the population density 
constantly changes along the route. 
 
Generalized approaches help address these variabilities in a consistent and 
usually conservative manner. The ability to eliminate or prevent risks is much greater for 
fixed facilities. In transportation, risk reduction is generally all that can be obtained. The 
Office of Technology Assessment estimated that 62 percent of hazardous material 
incidents are due to human error. The degree of variability and influence of human 
performance is often cited as being much greater for some modes of transportation than 
others and for transportation in general in comparison to fixed sites. This is particularly 
true for road transportation where the route taken can vary from one trip to another. The 
role of outside forces such as weather and other drivers or operators can also be quite 
significant. For instance, extensive training of truck drivers does not change the 
performance of other drivers on the road. Thus, the ability to control the overall impact 
of human errors is diminished in transportation.  
The nature of TRA data can be different from CPQRA data. They are often 
expressed as a function of distance traveled or per trip, transit, or visit. External event 
causes of accidents are generally included in the data-including such items as vandalism 
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for rail transport, adverse weather for marine transport, and third-party damage for 
pipelines. 
Other difference between transportation and fixed facility risk evaluations is the 
nature of the risk reduction and mitigation alternatives available. By virtue of the 
unknown location of a transportation release (prior to its occurrence), it is much more 
difficult to identify and implement effective mitigative (post-release) strategies. 
Secondary containment via diking, selective grading, water sprays, foams, evacuations, 
etc. are either not feasible, or can only be initiated some significant amount of time after 
the release has occurred. Given the rapid dispersion of many large releases, such 
mitigation measures may be totally infeasible or untimely. 
 
1.2.5. Reasons for Conducting a TRA 
TRA is a powerful tool in HazMat transportation decision making system. It can 
help a decision maker in choosing a site for a facility or process relocation or expansion, 
by taking both fixed site and transportation risks into account. It is helpful in choosing 
among alternate routes by providing information on the relative risks associated with 
each route, in selecting a mode of transportation when more than one is feasible, and in 
selecting the most effective container or knowing if additional protective measures are 
warranted. Based on the TRA results, decision makers can select appropriate risk 
reduction alternatives by demonstrating the effectiveness of various alternatives. In case 
a transportation incident occurs, TRA could provide the bases for developing emergency 
response plans. It can also help to understand the influence of material state on risks and 
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make judgments about the tolerability of existing or increased movement levels. 
 
1.3. Current Problems with TRA 
Some regulations and rules have been set to regulate HazMat transportation 
activities; however, those regulations are mainly addressing hardware and procedures. 
Compliance with those regulations does not necessarily guarantee the desired reduction 
in the level of risk.  
Significant level of risk reduction may be gained by the employment of decision 
support systems for HazMat transportation, for example, by selecting the route with 
relatively less risk. Selection for the best route for HazMat transportation involves 
comparisons of alternatives in the domain of risk. The TRA is the baseline for routing 
selection and many other actions made by decision makers.   
Some numerical methodology has been developed to assess the transportation 
risk; however, most of those proposed methodologies were hard to employ directly by 
decision or policy makers. One reason is that the methodologies were proposed without 
input data, or the methodology was too complicated to obtain available input data. For 
example, incident frequency and conditional release probability data were assumed to be 
available in most of the methodologies, but in fact the acquisition of the required data 
calls for considerable effort.  
Many data or databases on HazMat transportation have been analyzed to assess 
the risk components. Consider the Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS) as 
an example. HMIS is a national database with data on HazMat transportation incidents. 
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Battelle (2001) analyzed this database to measure the incident rate, the severity of 
transportation fatalities and injuries, and the dollar loss from high-consequence 
transportation incidents. Such kind of data/database analysis results should be adapted to 
a numerical model to measure the ultimate risk level.   
In many cases not all the data required by the TRA are available, thus some 
mathematical methodologies are needed to assess the required data based on expert 
experience or other information sources.   
The lack of the match between the data/database analysis and the numerical 
methodologies for TRA has prevented decision makers from making sound actions 
quickly. The methodologies to assess the transportation risk according to the availability 
of data or databases should be developed, so that the decisions on HazMat transportation 
could be made appropriately and reasonably based on the TRA results.   
 
1.4. Objectives and Scope 
From the above description, it is apparent that the match between the availability 
of data/databases and numerical methodologies for TRA needs to be pursued. To 
accomplish this goal, in this paper, each risk component, including frequency, release 
scenario, and consequence, is assessed based on the available data/database. The risk in 
the transportation network is then assessed by numerical algorithms step-by-step. 
The objectives of this research include: 
• Transportation network analysis to define the physical environment for TRA  
• Identification of HazMat transportation data/database 
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• Assessment of each risk component 
• Development of numerical methodologies to measure the transportation risk  
• Development of case study to show the application of methodologies 
• Development of routing methodologies for decision support system based on 
TRA results 
 
The ultimate goal of this research is to set up the framework for the assessment 
of transportation risk based on available data/databases, which will facilitate the set of 
regulations and rules, guide decision makers in HazMat transportation actions to prevent 
incident and reduce risk, and identify programs that can result in the greatest 
improvement in safety.   
 The scope of this research includes:  
• Highway transportation mode – our research will focus on the highway 
transportation rather than all the transportation modes including railroad, air, etc, 
because the highway mode dominates the transportation incident occurrence. As 
shown in Table 1.2, historically highway transportation has been responsible for 
almost 90% of the transportation incidents.  
• On-road incident only – our research only considers transportation incidents 
that occurred during transportation. Those that occurred during 
loading/unloading processes were not incorporated in our analysis, because those 
incidents are similar to fixed facility incidents.  
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• Bulk transportation – TRA will estimate only the incidents caused in bulk 
transportation, without including the non-bulk transportation. For example, 
anhydrous ammonia transported in cargo tanks MC 330 will be considered in our 
analysis, but those transported in small nurse tanks are not assessed.  
• Focused HazMat – to compare the risks that result from transporting various 
hazardous materials, the nature of the risk for each commodity needs to be 
evaluated and understood, but it is not practical to work on all the HazMat. In 
this research, only those most frequently shipped HazMat and those materials 
representative to different classes is evaluated.  
 
1.5. Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation introduces a framework to assess the HazMat transportation risk 
step-by-step. Chapter I introduces HazMat transportation and the general framework for 
TRA, and introduces a broad overview of the importance of TRA.  
 Chapter II presents a detailed literature review of current research status of TRA. 
Preliminary work in this area has been categorized as procedures, data availability, risk 
measurement tools, and application of Geographic Information System (GIS). Fuzzy 
logic is employed in this research for estimation when data are not available, so the 
fuzzy logic models are also presented in this chapter. Chapter III characterizes the 
transportation network. The real transportation network is transformed into a network 
expressed by nodes and links, and by this way TRA can be performed in a well-defined 
network environment. A description of overall TRA methodology is provided in Chapter 
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IV in detail. The data/databases availability is analyzed at first for each of the risk 
components. Incident frequency and release scenario are assessed based on the analysis 
results. The consequence is estimated with a commercially available software, 
CANARY. Individual risk and societal risk for HazMat transportation are determined by 
numerical models. Chapter V presents the case study to illustrate the employment of our 
TRA methodologies in the real world. Based on the TRA, the optimized routing 
methodology is presented in Chapter VI. It proves that the TRA have the ability to 
benefit decision support systems in HazMat transportation. LNG plays an increasingly 
important role in the natural gas industry and energy markets. The combination of recent 
interest in expanding or building new facilities to receive LNG carriers, along with 
increased awareness and concern about potential terrorist actions, has raised questions 
about the potential consequences of incidents involving LNG marine transportation. 
Chapter VII describes the consequence analysis results for marine transportation of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
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CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1. Previous Work on TRA 
Risk analysis is a sequential process, beginning with an understanding of the 
level of involvement of risk, the frequency and type of incident, and the consequence for 
a given incident scenario. The way those components are defined and determined should 
depend on the data available and the purpose of the risk assessment. In the past two 
decades, attention has been focused on risk analysis of HazMat within transportation 
networks, and the techniques of QRA initially developed for fixed plants have been 
extended to TRA.  
 
2.1.1. Procedures for Developing TRA Methodology 
Risk is defined in Chapter I in terms of two parameters: the likelihood of 
occurrence of an incident scenario and the magnitude of the incident consequence. Rowe 
(1983) characterizes quantitative risk analysis methodologies for transportation in three 
ways: (i) how they combine the two parameters to arrive at risk; (ii) the level of detail; 
and (iii) the methods for obtaining data and modeling parameters. As described in 
Chapter I, usually the framework for TRA includes the following steps: (i) TRA scope 
definition; (ii) shipment description; (iii) hazard or initiating event identification; (iv) 
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likelihood estimation; (v) consequence estimation; (vi) risk estimation; and (vii) 
utilization of risk estimation. In principle, these steps have to be repeated every time that 
any of the parameters involved in the above calculations changes along the itinerary, so 
usually a great deal of computation time is required to achieve the TRA goal. 
Researchers in this field have executed substantial efforts to explore the practical and 
reasonable methods to measure the risk associated with HazMat transportation.  
Ang (1989) suggested a general framework for risk analysis in transportation that 
decomposed the problem into three separate stages: (i) determination of an undesirable 
event, (ii) estimation of the level of potential exposure, and (iii) assessment of the 
magnitude of consequences.  
Abkowitz and Cheng (1988) attempted to measure the risk of hazardous material 
transportation by summing the cost of fatalities, major injuries, minor injuries, and 
damage to property. The risk was expressed as a risk profile, which is a probability 
distribution of incident likelihood and severity.  
Purdy (1993) estimated the impact to humans from flammable substances and 
toxic gases. The entire population that may be affected by a HazMat incident was 
considered in their model, including motorists on a road where an incident occurs, 
travelers on trains, and people who live near the transportation route.  
Erkut and Verter (1995) proposed that an assessment of HazMat transportation is 
a two-stage process that involves: (i) representation of risk via a quantitative model; and 
(ii) estimation of the model parameters. A basic model for risk assessment was presented 
in their work.  
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Kara, Erkut, and Verter (2003) pointed out that what differentiates HazMat 
transport models from other transport models is the explicit modeling of transport risk 
which usually consists of one or both of the following two factors: incident (i.e., spill, 
fire) probability and population impacted. They focused on modeling the incident 
probability and modeling the population exposure to quantify the risk along the 
transportation route.  
Vayiokas and Pitsiava-Latinopoulo (2004) developed a methodology for the risk 
assessment during road transportation of HazMat. Two critical factors have been taken 
into consideration: the probability of an outcome during incident occurrence and the 
consequences of the outcome. Theoretical risk source release model, exposure model, 
and consequence model were set up for the ultimate risk estimates.  
 Erkut and Verter (1995) and Leonelli, Bonvicini, and Spadoni (1999) proposed 
that a path between a given origin-destination pair can be represented by a set of road 
segments, where the road characteristics are uniform within each segment. The risk 
imposed on an individual due to a HazMat shipment can be estimated as the probability 
of an incident during transport multiplied by the probability of the individual 
experiencing the consequence as a result of the incident. At the same year, Spadoni, 
Leonelli, Verlicchi, and Fiore (1995) also proposed that the risk resulting from the 
transport of HazMat has to be calculated considering all the incidents occurring at any 
point of the road network, namely a set of linear source risk. The technique they used to 
perform linear source risk calculations is to divide each route into arcs, each then being 
considered as a point risk source. Next, a reassembling methodology has to be applied to 
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perform calculations of indicators of the area risk.   
Fabiano, Curro, Palazzi, and Pastorino (2002) developed a site-oriented 
framework of general applicability at local level. The evaluation of frequency took into 
account on one side inherent factors (e.g., slope, characteristics of neighborhood, etc.) on 
the other side factors correlated to the traffic conditions (e.g., dangerous goods trucks, 
etc.). The simple theoretical models were given to express both the incident frequency 
and the fatality number.  
Depending on the scope of the analysis, approximate as well as detailed 
approaches to TRA can be used. The former could be kept as simple as possible, in 
principle allowing also non-specialists to carry out the analysis and to immediately use 
its results for a basic evaluation of the risk level of the transport activity under 
consideration. The latter could be kept as accurate as possible, enabling a specialist to 
properly assess the risk, to investigate the presence of highly hazardous spots and to 
suggest effective mitigation measures. Bubbico, Cave, and Mazzarotta (2004a) proposed 
a simplified approach to TRA. Only limited number of incident scenarios and release 
consequences need to be estimated in this simplified approach. In this manner, TRA 
could be performed very rapidly to obtain the relevant risk measures, which can be then 
used for a preliminary assessment of the case.  
  
2.1.2. Risk Measurement Tools 
In CPQRA, a number of numerically different measures of risk can be derived 
from the same set of incident frequency and consequence data. Three commonly used 
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ways of combining incident frequency and consequence data to produce risk estimates 
are risk indices, individual risk, and societal risk (CCPS, 2000).  
Risk indices are single numbers or tabulations of numbers which are correlated to 
the magnitude of risk. Some risk indices are relative values with no specific units, which 
only have meaning within the context of the risk index calculation methodology. Other 
risk indices are calculated from various individual or societal risk data sets and represent 
a condensation of the information contained in the corresponding data set.  
Individual risk measures can be single numbers or a set of risk estimates for 
various individuals or geographic locations. In general, they consider the risk to an 
individual who may be in the effect zone of an incident or set of incidents. The size of 
the incident, in terms of the number of people impacted by a single event, does not affect 
individual risk. 
Societal risk measures are single number measures, tabular sets of numbers, or 
graphical summaries which estimate risk to a group of people located in the effect zone 
of an incident or set of incidents. Societal risk estimates include a measure of incident 
size (for example, in terms of the number of people impacted by the incident or set of 
incidents considered). Some societal risk measures are designed to reflect the 
observation that people tend to be more concerned about the risk of large incidents than 
small incidents, and may place a greater weight on large incidents. 
In the area of truck transport of HazMat, there have been widely varying 
applications of risk analysis since 1980s. They have been characterized by generic 
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treatment of HazMat or focus on a single substance or class, and have included a diverse 
set of risk measures.  
Abkowitz and Cheng (1988) measured the risk of HazMat transportation by 
summing the cost of fatalities, major injuries, minor injuries, and damage to property.  
Purdy (1993) estimated the risk through assessing the impact to humans from 
flammable substances and toxic gases. The entire population that may be affected by a 
HazMat incident was the measure of the risk level.  
Erkut and Verter (1998) used the expected undesirable consequences of HazMat 
transport as a measure of the associated societal risk, that is, their societal risk of 
HazMat transportation was defined as the probability of a release event during transport, 
multiplied by the consequence of that event. This societal risk of HazMat transport was 
calculated as an aggregation of the risks imposed on each individual living near the road 
used for transportation. They proposed each population center as a point on the plane 
whose population is assumed to be concentrated. This approach presumes that each 
individual in a population center will incur the same kind of risk due to the HazMat 
transportation. The risk imposed on an individual was calculated as a sum of the risks 
associated with each road segment on path. In general, a path between a given origin-
destination pair can be represented as a set of road segments, where the road 
characteristics are uniform within each segment.  
The most common risk measurements used to perform a quantitative risk analysis 
for a major incident in a plant, i.e., individual risk and societal risk, were also employed 
in TRA. Individual risk reflects the frequency of a specific health effect at a 
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geographical location. Its predictions are used to answer the question: how does the risk 
to an individual vary with location? Societal risk represents the overall risk associated 
with an activity to a particular population. The most common societal risk presentation 
technique is an f-N curve, which is a graph of the number of fatalities (N) on the 
abscissa and frequency (f) of N or more fatalities on the ordinate (CCPS, 1995). 
Methodology has been developed to evaluate individual and societal risk for a 
transportation network by a variety of authors (Fabiano, Curro, Palazzi, and Pastorino, 
2002; Vayiokas and Pitsiava-Latinopoulo, 2004). Advisory Committee on Dangerous 
Substances (1991) has pointed out that individual risk and societal risk are powerful 
tools for the measurement of transportation hazard impact. 
Spadoni, Leonelli, Verlicchi, and Fiore (1995) discussed the importance of the 
acceptability of risk criteria. Some European countries have adopted threshold values for 
individual risk by referring to statistical data on death probability either for natural 
events or for incidents not connected to industrial activities. The UK Health and Safety 
Executive has fixed a limit of 10-4, above which individual risk cannot be accepted under 
any circumstances and a limit value of 10-6 below which individual risk is considered 
broadly acceptable to members of the public. For the societal risk, the UK Health and 
Safety Executive has suggested for use as an upper maximum tolerable risk level a line 
of slope -1 through the point N=500, F=2*10-4 (per year) and, as a negligible risk level, a 
line of the same slope at three orders of magnitude below. The Dutch Government 
utilizes as an upper maximum tolerable level a line of slope -2 through the point N=10, 
F=10-5 (per year) and a parallel line two orders of magnitude below as negligible risk.    
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2.1.3. Data Availability in TRA 
Harwood and Russell (1990) made the first well-recognized attempt to assess the 
incident rate and the release probability based on certain databases. An analysis of 
existing incident, and exposure data before 1990 were presented in their report. The 
frequency, causes, circumstances, and consequences of HazMat transport have been 
characterized based on 5 years of data (1981-1985) from the HMIS. The analysis of 
exposure data were performed on the data available from the 1982 Truck Inventory and 
Use Survey conducted by the Bureau of Census.  
To develop system-wide truck incident rates, the data from three state highway 
agencies were analyzed by Harwood and Russell (1990). These agencies were the 
California, Illiouis, and Michigan Departments of Transportation. The incident rates, 
incident severity distributions, and incident type distributions for different highway and 
area type classes obtained in the analysis were presented. Some of the data analysis 
results were published later by Harwood, Viner, and Russell (1993).  
Rhyne (1994) compared the Harwood and Russell’ results with others performed 
earlier, and noted that the estimates of Harwood and Russell were reasonable for many 
risk calculations. Their results are still the most popularly cited for current research in 
TRA.  
Battelle (2001) analyzed HMIS database and utilized several sources of data to 
adjust the incidents reported in the HMIS. Data from 1990 through 1999 were used to 
create an annual portrait of HazMat impacts. This provided a large quantity of HazMat 
incident data from which consequence and likelihood values were obtained. Incident 
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number and impact results for HazMat transportation were broken down by HazMat 
classes. The incident rate and incident cost for each 12 HazMat classes were presented 
separately in this report. The results showed that more detail can be developed for some 
categories of HazMat because those classes or divisions have more incident exposure.  
 
2.1.4. Application of Geographic Information System (GIS) in TRA 
In order to perform an accurate TRA, the knowledge of territorial information of 
comparable accuracy is of paramount importance. In particular, data are needed about 
local distribution of population, incident rates, and weather conditions. Lepofsky, 
Abkowitz and Cheng (1993) first proposed to integrate GIS into TRA to manage those 
kinds of information. GIS is a system of computer software, hardware, and data that 
manipulates, analyzes, and presents information that is tied to a spatial location. GIS 
contain both geometry data (coordinates and topological information) and attribute data, 
i.e., information describing the properties of geometrical spatial objects such as points, 
lines, and areas. In the work of Lepofsky, Abkowitz, and Cheng (1993), GIS was 
employed to develop transportation networks that incorporate both physical and 
operational characteristics, and overlay these networks on other spatially referenced data.  
Fedra (1998) proposed to employ GIS in the spatial TRA. In GIS, the basic 
concept is one of location, of spatial distribution and relationships; the basic elements 
are spatial objects. GIS and its capability to map risks is clearly a powerful tool for risk 
assessment. The integration of GIS and simulation models, together with the necessary 
databases and expert systems, within a common and interactive graphical user interface 
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could make for more powerful, easy-to-use and easy-to-understand risk information 
systems. Based on a dedicated GIS as the central tool and user interface, databases of 
hazardous installations and hazardous chemicals are linked in a hypertext structure. They 
include tools for spatial risk assessment based on externally generated risk contours, and 
links to models describing accidental and continuous atmospheric releases, spills into 
surface water systems, and transportation risk analysis.  
 The dispersion models were suggested by Zhang, Hodgson, and Erkut (2000) to 
incorporate into route selection for HazMat transportation. To find minimal risk paths on 
a network, the Gaussian plume model is employed to model the air pollution dispersion. 
The information on surrounding locations in the model is treated by adopting raster GIS 
framework. The raster framework transforms a continuous space into a discrete one by 
modeling it as a tessellation of square arid cells called pixels. Raster is commonly used 
to approximate continuous surfaces in GIS. Raster GIS are organized as a number of 
layers, one assigned to each characteristic of interest. The traditional raster GIS overlay 
techniques were used to predict the spatial consequences of potential releases of airborne 
HazMat in a network. 
Verter and Kara (2001) set up a model to assess the total transport risk as well as 
the equity of its spatial distribution. They employed GIS to manage territorial 
information during the risk analysis of transportation network. A GIS-based model that 
was suitable for representing the HazMat transportation was constructed for Quebec and 
Ontario areas. Bubbico, Cave, and Mazzarotta (2002, 2004a) pointed out that the TRA 
tool developed based on the GIS approach allows risk assessment for various 
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transportation modes and permits to rapidly investigate possible benefits resulting from 
changes of routes.  
 
2.2. Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Logic Models 
Conventionally, a mathematical model of a system is constructed by analyzing 
input-output measurements from the system. However, additional important source of 
information on engineering systems is human expert knowledge. This knowledge is 
known as linguistic information. It provides qualitative instructions and descriptions of 
the system. While conventional mathematical model fails to include this type of 
information, fuzzy logic model can incorporate it conveniently. 
The core technique of fuzzy logic is based on three basic concepts: (1) fuzzy set: 
set with smooth boundary. Unlike the crisp set, fuzzy set has a smooth boundary, i.e., the 
elements of the fuzzy set can be partly within the set. Membership functions are 
employed to provide gradual transition from regions completely outside a set to regions 
completely in the set. (2) Linguistic variables: variables that are qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively described by a fuzzy set. Similar to a conventional set, a fuzzy set can be 
used to describe the value of a variable. (3) Fuzzy “if-then” rules: scheme, describing a 
functional mapping or a logic formula that generalizes an implication of two-valued 
logic. The main feature of the application of fuzzy “if-then” rules is its capability to 
perform inference under partial matching. It computes the degree the input data matches 
the condition of a rule. This matching degree is combined with the consequence of the 
rule to form a conclusion inferred by the fuzzy rule.  
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A fuzzy “if-then” rule associates a given condition to a conclusion, using 
linguistic variable and fuzzy sets. The most common fuzzy model, Mamdani model (Yen 
and Langari, 1999), consists of the following fuzzy “if-then” rules that describe a 
mapping from rUUU ××× ...21  to W : 
iR : If 1x  is 1iA , …, and rx  is irA , then y  is iC                                                  (2.1) 
Where, 
 jx  ( rj ,...,2,1= ): input variables 
 y : output variable  
ijA : fuzzy sets for jx  
iC : fuzzy sets for y  
 
The relationship between the various parameters and the accident is hard to be 
expressed by a function; however, it is possible to express the relationship among 
parameters by the fuzzy if-then rules. For example, if a driver is not experienced, then 
accident frequency is high. This type of association can be incorporated conveniently in 
fuzzy models. This characteristic is especially important given the complexity of 
transportation conditions and the level of human experience/knowledge on the system.  
 
2.3. Summary of Chapter II  
A comprehensive review of the research work done on TRA has been presented 
in this chapter. Efforts have been carried out to set up models to combine two parameters 
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of risk, likelihood of incident and the incident consequences, and to arrive at the 
measurements of risk. However, none of these methods has been extensively used in 
practice. The main reason is the unavailability and the lack of matching of the required 
input data to those models. 
Analysis has been performed on some historical databases to obtain the 
information on both the incident rate and the incident impact to personal health, 
properties and environment, but those data obtained could only be applied for qualitative 
comparisons between different transportation activities, and it is not enough for models 
to quantitatively evaluate potential risks or to evaluate alternative risk reduction 
strategies. 
This research is aimed at developing a practical and efficient TRA methodology 
based on available data/databases and expert knowledge. Historical data/databases are 
carefully observed and analyzed to derive the data according to the requirement of the 
model. Given the conditions where no enough data exist, some mathematical methods 
including fuzzy logic are employed to incorporate human linguistic information. The 
development of fuzzy logic model has been presented in this chapter. The TRA models 
are then set up based on the data analysis results. By matching the available data with the 
model set up, the TRA methodology can be applied directly in the decision support 
system to guide the operations of HazMat transportation.  
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CHAPTER III 
TRA METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Overview 
This chapter provides a general quantitative risk assessment methodology used to 
develop the risk profile. As presented in Chapter I, there are seven steps to perform 
TRA, including TRA scope definition, shipment description, hazard or initiating event 
identification, likelihood estimation, consequence estimation, risk estimation, and 
utilization of risk estimates. In our methodology development, some changes are made 
to this TRA framework due to our objectives/purposes.  
A general TRA methodology is developed in our study, which is expected to 
apply to the transportation of various HazMat. The shipment description is different 
according to the kinds of materials, so it is not included in our methodology. Only in the 
case study part, the shipment description is presented before the TRA.  
The development of our methodology takes account of the availability of 
data/databases. Hazard or initiating event identification is not performed in our study. 
From our incident frequency and release probability analysis, the hazard or initiating 
event is changed with the type of HazMat, tank condition, and other factors, and it 
affects the risk analysis result by changing incident frequency, release probability and 
consequence scenario. In our study the incident frequency, release probability and 
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consequence scenario are assessed based on the analysis of available data/databases, the 
effects of different kinds of HazMat, tank condition and other factors are considered in 
these steps, thus it is not necessary to perform the hazard or initiating event 
identification, and the release probability and consequence scenario analysis are included 
in our methodology.   
The whole TRA process is performed in transportation network, and some 
models and methodologies for network analysis are employed in our study, so it is 
necessary to characterize the transportation network at first.  
Based on above analysis, the TRA framework in our study is presented in Figure 
3.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Framework for comprehensive TRA. 
 
TRA scope definition 
Network characterization 
Likelihood estimation Release/scenario analysis Consequence Estimation 
Risk estimation 
Utilization of risk estimation 
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3.2. Network Characterization 
3.2.1. Network Transformation 
Analyzing risks from HazMat transportation is significantly complicated because 
the factors that influence the risk, such as incident probability, release amount, 
meteorology, and population density, vary both temporally and geographically. TRA is 
performed in transportation network, so all of those parameters need to be characterized 
in the network before the risk calculation.  
In Industrial Engineering, network is defined as interconnected set of nodes and 
links. Node is the point where flow is created, relayed or terminated. Link is channel for 
moving flow between two directly connected nodes. A transportation route can be 
considered as composed of links and nodes, and the set of transportation routes is 
regarded as transportation network. Before performing TRA on certain transportation 
activities, we need to transform the real highway network into network expressed by 
nodes and links.  
The principle for the network transformation is that each link has to have uniform 
properties at all its points, i.e., road condition, traffic volume, and other properties 
associated with road should be the same in one link.  By this way all points in one link 
will cause the same potential of transportation incident when a vehicle passes through 
them, and each link can be considered as a unit when performing TRA. 
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The other principle is that each link has to be straight. This principle is to 
simplify the risk integration through all points of a link. This condition can easily be 
obtained without any loss in generality by adding fictitious nodes to the network.  
Based on those principles, the transportation road network can be transformed 
into the network expressed by nodes and links. Set in such a network defined by a set of 
nodes and links, all parameters on risk assessment can be easily characterized, which 
makes the overall risk assessment easy. On the other hand, decision makers can guide 
transportation activities by employing abundant algorithms and models developed for 
network circumstance. For example, the network “minimum cost flow” model can easily 
be employed in selecting the transportation route under certain conditions.  
 
3.2.2. Network Characterization 
Risk assessment is typically structured as a process resulting from the interaction 
between (i) the transportation network, (ii) the vehicle or traveling risk source, and (iii) 
the impact area. 
When performing the transportation risk analysis each link has to be 
characterized by some properties. For a link l of a set Nlink, the link properties to take into 
account are the following: 
• The geographical position in the impact area; to do this a Cartesian reference 
frame X/Y with origin OX/Y has to be arbitrarily overlapped on the impact area. 
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• The amount of the yearly shipments Nship(v) traveling on each link for each 
vehicle typology v, i.e., on a specific conveyance means carrying a specific 
substance.  
• The incident frequency Pincident, expressed in events/(km.vehicle). This variable is 
generally a function of the route features, the traffic conditions, environmental 
conditions, and driver status.  
 
As already mentioned therein, a transportation route can be viewed as a linear 
risk source, since a release can occur at each of its points; this means that each of its 
points can be considered as a point risk source, or, in other words, the generic vehicle 
has to be considered as a traveling risk source. Therefore the second step in 
transportation risk analysis is the vehicle or traveling risk source characterization.  
In order to perform this description, the concept of “vehicle typology” has to be 
introduced. Vehicle typology is a certain kind of vehicle conveying certain kind of 
HazMat which could caused hazard if a release occurs during the transportation. For 
example, a truck tanker conveying ammonia is a kind of vehicle typology. The 
combination of link and vehicle typology could define the risk source associated with 
each link. The properties associated with the link-vehicle typology pair for TRA purpose 
are defined as: 
• The release probability for each vehicle typology. That is the probability of 
having a release once an incident has happened. Vehicle construction standards 
strongly depend on the features of the transported substance; in other words the 
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release probability depends on the vehicle typology. Furthermore it can also 
depend on the link since it can be higher on high speed than on low speed route 
segments.  
 
In order to identify and quantify incident scenarios referred to each traveling risk 
source and to predict the consequence of each incident scenario, the following 
parameters are required: 
• The transportation conditions for each substance, i. e., the temperature and 
pressure values at which the substance is stored in the transportation vehicle and 
the vehicle capacity.  
• The probability of the size of the equivalent holes which have been chosen to 
describe all possible releases from each vehicle typology. For each vehicle 
typology and for each rupture size a physical aspect of the outcome and a release 
rate, or a release quantity in case of instantaneous release, have to be evaluated. 
• The final outcomes to which each hole size of each vehicle typology can lead, 
that is if a toxic cloud arises, or an explosive one, or a pool flame, or a jet-fire 
and so on. Each vehicle typology can lead to No final outcomes.  
• The probability of having the final outcome once a release has occurred, Po, i.e., 
the product of the probability of the release being of a specific equivalence size, 
once the releae has occurred, and the probability of having final outcome, once 
the release of this specific equivalence hole has occurred. 
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The impact area characterization includes both the definition of some parameters 
which influence the release effects evaluation and the description of the population 
distribution.  
To perform the release effects evaluation, it is necessary to define: 
• Some physical parameters, like the air temperature and air humidity; the average 
terrain roughness, the terrain typology, the grade of confinement and so on. 
• Meteorological conditions characterizing the impact area, given by atmospheric 
stability class and wind speed.  
• Wind probability density distribution that is the wind rise in the impact area, for 
each meteorological condition. The angle θ is used to mark a wind direction.  
 
All the parameters influencing the effects evaluation can vary from zone to zone 
of the impact area, especially when considering very large areas, and the procedure takes 
into account these variations.  
The distribution of the population on the impact area is an essential input for 
calculating societal risk. A population map is composed of zones, where people may be 
considered uniformly distributed, and of aggregation centers, where people are clustered. 
The total numbers of these zones and centers and their population density need to be 
determined.  
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3.2.3. Risk Analysis for Network Transportation 
Sine risk is additive, in transportation network the risk caused by a vehicle 
transporting along a highway route is the sum of risk caused by vehicle passing each link 
in the route, and the risk caused by each link is the sum of the risk caused by each point 
in that link.  The framework for risk analysis in transportation network is shown in 
Figure 3.2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Network TRA process. 
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3.3. Incident Frequency Analysis 
Risk is a combination of two parameters: frequency and the magnitude of the 
consequence. A quantitative risk analysis incorporates numerical estimates of the 
frequency and the consequences in a sophisticated but approximate manner. The 
specification of incident frequency has been the subject of extensive efforts in the risk 
assessment community. Currently, the most popular cited data for incident frequency 
took only few factors into consideration. We develop an approach on the basis of an 
analysis of national commodity flow information and HazMat incident data. The 
methodology is presented to predict the incident frequency for different types of roads 
by incorporating the effects of a large number of parameters, including the nature of 
truck configurations, operation conditions, environmental factors, and road conditions.  
 
3.3.1. Background on Incident Frequency Assessment  
Incident frequency can be defined as the number of incidents occurred per unit of 
road (mile, kilometer, etc.). It can be computed by dividing the number of incidents by 
the number of vehicle miles, which is the corresponding exposure measure of 
opportunities for an incident to occur.  
There are three basic options to assess incident frequency with reasonable 
accuracy (Rhyne, 1994). The first is to obtain one database (or more) and to perform 
analysis to determine both incident data and exposure data for the specific conditions 
under investigation (assuming that the dataset is structured to support distinction 
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between the desired variables). Second option is to access state databases for specific 
routes. States frequently have incident data and exposure data for the major state 
highways. A third option is to use an existing limited analysis of databases and apply the 
results to a specific route of interest.  
Detailed analyses of several publicly available databases have made it possible to 
specify incident frequency on a per-mile basis. One of the most detailed analyses of such 
data was conducted by Harwood and Russell (1990). On the basis of computerized data 
files from three states – California, Illinois, and Michigan, Harwood and Russell 
calculated the incident frequency by using the number of reported incidents and the total 
number of truck-miles exposed. The incident frequency is assessed as a function of road 
type, truck type, and population density. Brown and Dunn (2000) analyzed Harwood and 
Russell’s data and divided their statistics into two road categories – interstates and non-
interstates (state highways) – and three population density categories – urban, suburban, 
and rural. Bubbico, Cave, and Mazzarotta (2004b) have pointed out that both route-
independent and route-dependent parameters affect risk. 
Several problems exist in above analysis on incident frequency. The first one is 
that the well-accepted data on incident frequency, that is, the statistics of Harwood and 
Russell (1990), was obtained based on the analysis of incident databases of 1980s. The 
status of transportation incidents has changed over the last two decades as shown in 
Figure 1.1. So did the incident reporting system with the heightened consciousness on 
the risk of HazMat transportation incidents. The statistics of Harwood and Russell (1990) 
are to a large extent, update to take into account the changes since 1980s. The second 
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problem is that the neglect of the premier effect of transportation road on incident 
frequency. When performing database analysis to derive incident frequency, we should 
try to disaggregate the incident database for different road rather than for different kinds 
of HazMat or other parameters. The third problem is that these above analyses failed to 
improve the frequency data sensitivity by incorporating parameters describing the nature 
of the roads, characteristics of the trucks, environmental factors, and driver conditions. 
In our research an integrated methodology to predict incident frequency is developed by 
incorporating the effects of various parameters, including both route-dependent and 
route-independent variables.  
 
3.3.2. Data and Database Analysis 
Both incident and vehicle-mile data are required to assess the incident frequency. 
HMIS is the national database with data on HazMat transportation incidents. Container 
types, consequences of incidents, and other information are available in this database. 
However, incidents that occurred on intrastate roads and incidents not resulting in spill 
are not recorded in this database. Battelle (2001), in a report to the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration, suggested supplementing HMIS with additional databases that 
consist of data on non-spill incidents and other spill incidents (especially intrastate 
incidents).  
The Departments of Public Safety (DPS) incident databases from each state 
consist of incident data gathered from state highways. Since these databases are 
collected by state DPS, the probabilities of underreporting on intrastate incidents are 
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much less. These databases can be disaggregated into various sub-databases, with each 
sub-database corresponding to a road. This capability makes it relatively easy to assess 
the incident frequency for a specific road.  
In our research state DPS databases are analyzed to determine incident frequency. 
A sub-database associated with a certain road is formed by subtracting all incidents 
occurring on that road. Incidents recorded in DPS databases are described by parameters 
on road and environmental conditions. Several parameters that affect incident frequency 
are as follows:   
• Lane number (x1) 
• Weather (x2)  
• Population density (x3)  
 
Incident frequency specific for a road is predicted based on analysis on its sub-
database. This frequency is a function of above route-dependent parameters. 
Several route-independent parameters that affect incident frequency, but are not 
available in DPS databases, are as follows: 
• Truck configuration (y1) 
• Container capacity (y2) 
• Driver experience (y3) 
 
The frequency obtained by considering route-dependent parameters has to be 
modified by incorporating route-independent parameters, i.e., the assessment of the 
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frequency needs to incorporate data from different sets as follows: basic incident 
frequency is derived from DPS database initially; only the route-dependent parameters 
are considered; the effects of route-independent parameters on incident frequency are 
derived from other database such as HMIS or from expert knowledge. Then the final 
incident frequency is a function of both route-dependent and route-independent 
parameters. It is essential to use fuzzy logic in the modification process for the following 
two reasons: (i) the information available in HMIS is on nationwide transportation 
activities, while the data derived from DPS is for specific roads, i.e., data obtained from 
HMIS cannot be applied directly; (ii) the effects of several of the parameters on the 
frequency cannot be derived from any database; thus, expert judgment has to be 
employed in the assessment.  
In addition to the number of incidents, the number of miles traveled (exposure 
data) is needed. The most common cited exposure data source is the Commodity Flow 
Survey (CFS) (US Census Bureau, 2004). CFS is based on 5-year economic census. The 
most up-to-date CFS is that of 2002. It provides information on commodities shipped, 
their value, weight, and mode of transportation. Exposure data on state highways can 
also be obtained from state DOT or transportation institutes (TI). In many cases both the 
data from CFS and data from state DOT or TI are needed to assess the exposure data for 
specific roads.  
 
3.3.3. Incident Frequency Analysis Methodology 
Based on the analysis above, incident frequency can be predicted as follows:  
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• Number of incidents is derived from the DPS databases as a function of route-
dependent parameters. 
• The corresponding vehicle-mile data are obtained from states DOT or TI and 
from the 2002 CFS. The basic incident frequency is obtained by dividing the 
number of incidents by the number of miles traveled.  
• The basic incident frequency is modified by considering the effects of route-
independent parameters. Fuzzy logic is employed to incorporate the expert 
knowledge. The membership functions of these parameters are built based on the 
data available in the HMIS database or based on expert experience.  
 
The flow chart in Figure 3.3 presents the process of utilizing the variety of data 
sources to establish an incident frequency assessor. 
A case study is presented following the development of the methodology. 
HazMat incident frequency on US Highway 290 in Texas is predicted to illustrate the 
performance of our methodology. 
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Figure 3.3. Prediction of incident frequency – a flow chart. 
 
 
3.3.3.1. Basic Incident Frequency Assessment   
Table 3.1 shows the structure of DPS database. It consists of data extracted from 
Texas DPS, and this sub-database contains records on incidents that occurred on US 
Highway 290. There are more than three parameters that describe the conditions of each 
incident. These parameters are listed in the first row in the table. The parameters are 
treated as linguistic variables, and the numeric values in the table are designated to 
represent the values of those linguistic parameters. For example, the variable “surface 
condition” has four linguistic values: 1-dry, 2-wet, 3-muddy, and 4-snowy/icy.  
Weather 
Incident data 
DPS database 
HMIS 
database 
Exposure data 
DOT, TI, CFS 
Base Incident frequency 
Frequency Assessor 
Ultimate Incident frequency 
Frequency modifier 
Fuzzy Logic 
toolbox 
Lane # 
Population density 
Truck type 
Container capacity 
Driver experience 
Expertise 
experience 
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Table 3.1 
DPS incident database – sample of records of incidents occurring on US Highway 290 
COUN
TY 
district 
MILE
1 
milepo
int 
WEATH
ER 
SURF_C
ON 
ROAD_C
ON 
INVES
T 
ROADW
AY 
INTRSE
CT 
…
 
101 315 1 1 0 3 1 4 …
101 356 2 2 0 3 1 3 …
101 313 1 1 0 2 1 2 …
101 332 1 1 0 3 1 4 …
101 381 2 4 5 6 3 4 …
101 364 8 4 5 2 3 4 …
101 384 8 4 5 6 1 4 …
101 308 8 4 5 5 3 4 …
101 243 8 4 5 6 1 4 …
101 211 3 1 4 5 9 3 …
101 367 2 2 2 5 9 3 …
… … … … … … … … …
 
 
DPS data for ten years (from 1992 to 2001) are utilized in this study. The data are 
sorted by using Matlab at first to obtain the number of incidents under all the given 
conditions in the databases. Then the number of incidents under any conditions needs to 
be estimated as a function of those three route-dependent parameters. An appropriate 
count data model is needed for this estimation. Four approaches were considered for this 
purpose: linear regression, Poisson regression, negative binomial model, and Bayesian 
estimation. The following paragraphs discuss these approaches.  
 
• Many of the early works in empirical analysis have been done using multiple 
linear regression models. However, these models suffer from several 
methodological limitations and practical inconsistencies. The two major 
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deficiencies are: a) linear regression assumes a normal distribution of the 
dependent variable, which is not valid for count (incident) data; b) linear 
regression may produce negative estimates for the dependent variable. 
• Poisson model has several advantages in comparison to normal regression model. 
It assumes that the data follows a Poisson distribution, a distribution frequently 
encountered when events are counted. Despite its advantages, Poisson regression 
assumes that the variance and mean of the dependent variable are equal. 
However, it is quite common to have the variance of data that is substantially 
higher than the mean. This phenomenon is known as “over-dispersion”. Over-
dispersion leads to invalid t-tests of the estimated parameters. This restriction can 
be avoided by using negative binomial regression, which allows the variance of 
the dependent variable to be larger than the mean.  
• Bayesian estimation can combine sample information with other information that 
may be available prior to collecting the sample. In Bayesian model, each input 
independent variable has a probability distribution that is a function of one 
parameter (known as prior). This approach is useful when uncertainty exists in 
input variables. However, in DPS databases, the four affecting parameters have 
been defined and categorized. 
 
Therefore, the negative binomial regression model is the best choice to assess the 
number of incidents. The regression model is derived from the statistical software SAS. 
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Then the number of incidents under any condition is estimated using the model 
established by SAS.  
Exposure data is obtained from state DOT or TI and the 2002 CFS. Since the 
number of incidents is a function of several parameters, the corresponding number of 
miles traveled needs to consider the effects of the same parameters, i.e., the exposure 
data have to be disaggregated by the same factors.  
Finally, the basic incident frequency is obtained by dividing the number of 
incidents by the number of miles traveled. This frequency is expressed as ( )321 ,, xxxfbasic . 
Figure 3.4 consists of schematic presentation of the algorithm of prediction of basic 
incident frequency. 
 
3.3.3.2. Modification to the Basic Incident Frequency Data  
Basic frequency data need to be modified to incorporate the effects of the 
following parameters: Truck configuration (y1), Container capacity (y2), and Driver 
experience (y3). These three parameters are not road-related variables, and their effects 
on the frequency are independent from road condition. In this study Fuzzy Mamdani 
models are employed to assess the effects of y1, y2, and y3 on the frequency. MatLab 
software is employed to help the model setup. A modifier, expressed as ( )3,2,1=imi , is 
generated for each of these 3 parameters, and then the ultimate incident frequency is 
expressed as: ( )321 mmmff basicultimate ×××= .  
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Figure 3.4. Schematic presentation of an algorithm of prediction of basic incident frequency. 
 
 
y1, y2, and y3 are treated as linguistic variables. The frequency modifiers are 
viewed as linguistic variables as well. Each linguistic variable is defined by several 
fuzzy sets. The membership function for each fuzzy set is determined either by expert 
experience or from available data. Analysis is performed on the HMIS database to 
develop the membership functions for Truck configuration. The membership functions 
for Driver experience and Container capacity are determined based on expert experience. 
Then, the fuzzy “if-then” rules are built to associate each affecting variable, yi, to the 
Vehicle mile number 
Lane # 
Population density          Incident number 
Weather 
MS Access
SAS 
Negative binomial model 
Incident number under any condition 
DPS database DOT, TI, CFS 
Incident frequency 
 53
corresponding modifier, mi. For example, driver experience (y3), as shown in Figure 3.5, 
is expressed by three fuzzy sets: novice, medium, and experienced. The driver 
experience modifier variable (m4) also includes three fuzzy sets: low, medium, and high.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Driver experience membership function. 
 
 
The “if-then” rules are set up as: 
If driver experience is novice, then the driver experience modifier is high, 
If driver experience is medium, then the driver experience modifier is medium, 
If driver experience is experienced, then the driver experience modifier is low. 
 
Fis editor in Matlab is used to defuzzify the process based on input data in order 
to derive the output modifier. After the set-up of these rules, driver experience data can 
be input to the model. Then, defuzzification is performed in order to obtain a numerical 
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output value. The value obtained after the defuzzification is the driver experience 
modifier (m3) as shown in Figure 3.6. Other modifiers are obtained similarly.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Defuzzification process in Matlab. 
 
 
3.3.4. Case Study 
3.3.4.1. Calculation of Number of Incidents by SAS 
As mentioned earlier, this case study will address sections from US Highway 290 
in Texas, a road connecting Houston and Austin.  Figure 3.7 presents the control section 
map for Houston area. The sections under study are between Highway 6 and Highway 
610 as shown in the figure.   
DPS databases from 1992 to 2001 are employed in this study. 9536 incidents are 
recorded for this period. The data was sorted by Matlab and input into SAS. 
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Figure 3.7. Control section map for Houston TX. 
 
 
The parameter estimations are shown in Table 3.2. The definitions of each value 
of the parameters of DPS are given in Table 3.3. The number of incidents under any 
conditions (denoted as POP, NUMN_LN, and WERATHER) is estimated by the 
following equation:  
( ) )( 3210,, kjiekjiN ββββ +++=  (3.1) 
Where, 
N: number of incidents 
i: linguistic value of population density, 0, 1, 3, 4, or 9 
j: linguistic value of number of lanes, 4, 5, 6, 8, or 10 
k: linguistic value of weather condition, 1 or 2 
0β : intercept of regression equation 
 
Highway 610
Highway 6
US 290 
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1β : regression coefficient for variable population density 
2β : regression coefficient for variable number of lanes 
3β : regression coefficient for variable weather condition 
 
Pearson’s chi-square is used to calculate goodness of fit. The P-value for the 
Pearson’s chi-square is computed from the output of SAS. The calculated P-value is 
0.1976, which is larger than 0.05. Thus, the derived negative binomial models pass the 
chi-square goodness-of-fit test at the 0.05 confidence level, i.e., the level of fitness of the 
negative binomial model is acceptable.  
 
Table 3.2  
Parameter estimation  
Parameter Parameter categories Parameter estimates 
0 -1.5727      
1 -6.0371      
3 -1.7244      
4 -2.2201      
POP 
(β1) 
 
9 0.0000      
4 2.3151      
5 -2.3590      
6 2.6869      
8 2.5499      
NUMN_LN (β2) 
10 0.0000      
1 1.9717      WEATHER 
(β3) 2 0.0000      
β0 =3.1703 
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Table 3.3  
Parameter meaning in DPS 
Parameter Parameter categories Parameter meaning 
0 Rural       
1 Town under 2,499 pop.    
3 2,500-4,999 pop.     
4 5,000-9,999 pop.      
POP 
(β1) 
 
9 250,000 pop. and over      
4 Number of lanes = 4 
5 Number of lanes = 5 
6 Number of lanes = 6 
8 Number of lanes = 8 
NUMN_LN  
(β2) 
10 Number of lanes = 10 
1 Clear (cloudy)      WEATHER 
(β3) 2 Raining (other)      
 
 
The test for detecting over-dispersion in the Poisson process is performed in 
order to verify that either Poisson regression or negative binomial regression can be used 
to analyze DPS database. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 provide the fit statistics for Poisson 
and negative binomial models. For Poisson model, the values of Pearson Chi-sq and 
deviance divided by the degrees of freedom are significantly larger than 1, i.e., this is a 
case of over-dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), and Poisson models cannot be 
used. Since negative binomial models are not restricted by over-dispersion, it should be 
used in the methodology.  
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Table 3.4  
Criteria for assessing goodness of fit for Poisson regression 
Criterion DF Value Value/DF 
Deviance 15 2827.9395        188.5293 
Scaled Deviance       15 2827.9395         188.5293 
Pearson Chi-
Square         
15 2626.1428         175.0762 
Scaled Pearson X2   15 2626.1428         175.0762 
Log Likelihood         56708.2067  
 
 
Table 3.5 
Criteria for assessing goodness of fit for negative binomial regression 
Criterion DF Value Value/DF 
Deviance 15 26.9834 1.7989 
Scaled Deviance       15 26.9834 1.7989 
Pearson Chi-
Square         
15 10.4236           0.6949 
Scaled Pearson X2   15 10.4236           0.6949 
Log Likelihood         58058.0075  
 
 
3.3.4.2. Exposure Data Assessment 
Exposure data for US Highway 290 are obtained from Texas Transportation 
Institute (TTI).  The exposure data could be disaggregated by the number of lanes and 
population density group. The data disaggregated need to be segmented further to 
incorporate the effect of weather.   
According to the National Climate Data Center (2005), the normal annual 
precipitation is 47.84 inches. The rain rate is modeled by Crane (2005). His study shows 
that the percentage of raining time over a year in Houston area is about 3.9%. The 
 59
annual precipitation assessed by multiplying the raining rate by the raining time is about 
53.3 inches, very close to the data reported by the National Climate Data Center. Thus, 
the assessment by Crane is employed here, but was approximated as 5% of the raining 
percentage over a year. We assume the weather condition would affect the 
corresponding vehicle mile data equally over the number of lanes and population group.  
The completely disaggregated exposure data are shown in Table 3.6. By dividing 
the estimated number of incidents with the corresponding exposure data, the basic 
incident frequency is calculated. 
 
Table 3.6  
Exposure (vehicle miles) data for control section 58 and 59 on US Highway 290 
NUM_LN Exposure data 
(vehicle miles) 4 5 6 8 10 
0 498870024 1405378 951118019 / 3931089 
1 / / 4152767 / / 
3 444307187 / 14353884654 / / 
4 243085504 / 213621596 / / 
1 POP 
9 54087951 / 2601401642 1447712804 249977292 
0 26256317 73967 50058843 / 206899 
1 / / 218566 / / 
3 23384589 / 755467613 / / 
4 12793974 / 11243242 / / 
Weather 
 
2 POP 
9 2846734 / 136915876 76195410 13156700 
 
 
3.3.4.3 Fuzzy Logic Modification  
The basic frequency data need to be modified to incorporate the effects of Truck 
configuration (y1), Container capacity (y2), and Driver experience (y3). y1, y2, and y3, are 
treated as linguistic variables. The frequency modifiers are viewed as linguistic variables 
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as well. Each linguistic variable is defined by several fuzzy sets, and the membership 
functions for each fuzzy set are determined either by experts or from data.  
The effects of driver experience and the container capacity on the incident 
frequency is assessed utilizing expert experience. The membership functions plots and 
the corresponding modifiers plots are shown in Figures 3.5, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.  
Harwood and Russell (1990) studied the effects of truck configuration on the 
incident frequency. Based on their result, triangular membership functions are set for 
four different vehicle configurations and their modifiers as shown in Figures 3.11 and 
3.12. 
After the determination of membership functions, the fuzzy “if-then” rules are set 
using expert experience and the Harwood and Russell work (1990). Given any input data 
of the route-independent parameters, the corresponding modifier is derived from this 
fuzzy model. This process is the defuzzification process. Figure 3.6 illustrates the 
defuzzification process to derive the modifier for driver experience.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Driver modifier membership function. 
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Figure 3.9. Container capacity membership function. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Container modifier membership function. 
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Figure 3.11. Truck configuration membership function. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Configuration modifier membership function. 
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3.3.4.4. Effect of Various Parameters on Incident Frequency 
Figures 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 and Table 3.7 present the effect of number of lanes, 
truck configuration, population density, and road condition on the incident frequency.  
An increase in population density increases the frequency as shown in Figure 
3.13. When the number of lanes changed from 4 to 6, the incident frequency decreases 
somewhat when the population group is 0; however it increases for the other population 
groups.  Incident frequency is relatively low in rural areas, so the effects of number of 
lanes are not prominent. Other reason for this inconsistency may be poor data sample. 
Our study focus on control section 58 and 59 for US Highway 290. Study on more 
sections may be able to obtain the effects of number of lanes on the frequency in rural 
area. Figure 3.15 shows that weather conditions affects the frequency significantly. The 
frequency increases under rainy weather in comparison to the frequency under clear 
weather. The increase is more significant when the number of lanes is 6 and the 
population group is between 5,000 and 10,000. This may be the case, or may not be 
accurate due to the inadequacy of the data sample.  
As for route-independent parameters, an increase in both the complexity of 
vehicle configuration and container capacity increases the frequency (shown in Figure 
3.14). Table 3.7 illustrates the effects of driver experience. The accumulation of driver 
experience is helpful in decreasing the probability of incident. 
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Figure 3.13. Effects of number of lanes and population density on the incident frequency. 
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Figure 3.14. Effects of container capacity and truck configuration on the incident frequency. 
 
 
Table 3.7 
Effects of driver experience on the incident frequency 
Driver experience Driver modifier Incident frequency (Incident/vehicle mile) 
0.1 1.14 1.65821E-06 
0.6 0.791 1.15057E-06 
0.8 0.86 1.25093E-06 
 
 65
 
(4,0): Number of lanes=4 
          Pop group =0 
(6,4): Number of lanes=6 
          Pop group =4 
 
 
Figure 3.15. Effects of weather condition on the incident frequency. 
 
 
A methodology to predict incident frequency of HazMat transportation has been 
presented in this section based on empirical data. The integrated models incorporate the 
effects of both route-dependent and route-independent variables. This methodology can 
be applied to predict frequencies associated with a given road as long as data with 
incident records and exposure information are available for this type of road.  
 
3.4. Release Scenario Analysis 
3.4.1. Conditional Probability of Release 
The release probability is a conditional probability that a release will occur 
following an incident. The probability of a release in a case of transportation of HazMat 
is affected by the following four parameters: 
• Vehicle characteristics 
0.00E+00
5.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.50E-06
2.00E-06
2.50E-06
4,0 6,4
Road condition
Clear
Raining
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• The nature of the incident 
• Characteristics of the transported material 
• The conditions of transport 
 
Vehicle characteristics include the strength and integrity of the container, as well 
as specific mitigation factors such as antisloshing devices and the height of the center of 
gravity of the loaded vehicle. Strength and integrity are functions of the material and 
wall thickness of the container, the presence or absence of a double wall, 
compartmentalization of cargo, and the use of any protective shielding devices. These 
measures either affect the potential for container rupture or puncture or, in the event of 
container failure, they affect the quantity of material released.  
Incidents can be classified as follows: (i) High speed collision, (ii) Low speed 
collision, (iii) Overturning, and (iv) Non-incident initiated release. 
The type of the HazMat and the conditions of transport also affect the release 
probability. These factors mainly affect the size of the release. Other factors are the 
material phase (liquid or gas), the temperature, and the pressure. While pressurized gas 
will increase the rate of the release, the size of the release area is the main factor that 
dictates the release rate. 
Rhyne (1994) has studied the incident force types and force magnitudes to 
evaluate the conditional failure probabilities for a spectrum of release sizes. However, it 
is still difficult to predict the size of the release by analyzing the impact of the 
mechanical force.  
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Due to the limitation in performing analysis of the impact of the mechanical 
force, a statistical inference will be used to extract the conditional probability of release. 
This methodology is based on sufficient historical data that allow inferring the 
conditional probability for the variety of containers. The selection of container for 
HazMat transport has been regulated in 49 CFR. Brown and Dunn (2000) also 
mentioned the information on the containers utilized to transport the selected HazMat. 
The selected HazMat include Chlorine, Ammonia, LPG, gasoline, and other explosives. 
By using the release data from the HMIS database, Brown and Dunn (2000) estimated 
the release probability by dividing the number of reported releases by the estimated 
number of incidents. Although this approach has a considerable degree of uncertainty, it 
provides a large statistical sample that consists of data on specific container types. The 
results of this analysis are used to obtain the conditional probability of release in our 
study.    
 
3.4.2. Consequence Scenario Analysis 
The size of a release affects the magnitude of the severity of the consequences. 
HMIS consists of information on whether a release occurred, as well as on the size of the 
release and on the resulting consequences. This combination of parameters is required to 
quantify the probability of release for a variety of consequence scenarios.  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is employed in our methodology in order to develop 
the propagation sequence of each of the variety of scenarios, and to calculate the final 
probability of each type of consequences. HMIS will be disaggregated for each 
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hazardous material and each type of container. For a variety of common hazardous 
materials, including ammonia, chlorine, LNG, LPG, and gasoline, data will be analyzed 
and substituted in the appropriate branches on the tree.   
ETA enables the assessment of multiple, co-existing system faults and failures as 
well. It functions simultaneously in the failure and success domains. Here the event tree 
has three possible release magnitudes:  
• A rupture: release area equal to the area of a 4-inch diameter hole 
• A puncture: release area equal to the area of a 1-inch diameter hole 
• A leak: release area equal to the area of a ¼ -inch diameter hole 
 
One or more hazards may be created by each of these failure categories. In LPG, 
for example, the possible consequences upon release are:  
• Torch fire: results from immediate ignition of the release 
• Flash fire: may result from delayed ignition of the release 
• Vapor dissipation: no ignition occurs after the release  
 
Figure 3.16 is an example of event tree of propagation of a release of propane.  
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LPG Release  
Release 
magnitude Delayed fire Immediate fire Outcome 
Rupture 0.03 
Yes 0.15 
No 0.85 
Yes 0.12 
No 0.88 
Puncture 0.25 
Yes 0.10 
No 0.90 
Yes 0.17 
No 0.83 
Leak 0.72 
Yes 0.02 
No 0.98 
Yes 0.03 
No 0.97 
P1=1.08*10-4 
P2=7.34*10-5 
P3=5.38*10-4 
P3=6.00*10-4 
P3=9.18*10-4 
P6=4.48*10-3 
P7=3.46*10-4 
P8=5.08*10-4 
P9=1.64*10-2 
0.024 
release/incident 
Conditional 
release occurs 
Probability 
Torch fire from 
rupture 
Flash fire from 
rupture 
Dissipation from 
rupture 
Torch fire from 
puncture 
Flash fire from 
puncture 
Dissipation from 
puncture 
Torch fire from 
leak 
Flash fire from 
leak 
Dissipation from 
leak 
 
 
Figure 3.16.Example of event tree of propagation of a release of propane.  
 
 
3.5. Consequence Analysis 
Several factors govern the severity of the consequences. Among these factors are 
the amount of material released, toxicity of the chemical, health effects of the released 
materials, characteristics of the population and the environment adjacent to the site of 
the incident, and the weather conditions at the time of the incident. The interplay among 
these factors produces a risk spectrum.  
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A variety of consequence analysis software is available in the market. In this 
study we utilize CANARYTM, consequence analysis package, to assess the consequence. 
CANARYTM calculates the consequences, based on the physical properties and based on 
consequence models that are available in the literature. Given a release occurs during 
transportation, the majority of potential hazards can be modeled. These include toxic 
vapor cloud, flammable vapor cloud, unconfined vapor cloud explosion, pool fire, torch 
fire, flare, BLEVE, and confined explosion.  
 
3.6. Individual Risk Analysis  
A personal consequence could be minor injury, major injury, or fatality. This 
document concentrates on incurring the probability of death as a basis for assessing risk. 
The consequences resulting from an incident are obtained from CANARYTM, including 
overpressure due to explosion, toxic vapor density, and/or radiant heat flux. It is 
combined with the proper exposure times to obtain the corresponding received doses. 
Doses are then converted to fatalities using Probit Correlations (CCPS, 2000). Thus, the 
fatality probability can be estimated for any given point.  
Among the parameters that are considered in the risk analysis, are incident 
frequency and weather conditions. These variables are rarely constant along a route. To 
get a more accurate estimate of the risk, the transportation route is broken into a set of 
links. As presented in the network characterization part of this chapter, a basic 
assumption is that all factors are constant along a link. The individual risk at point M(x, y) 
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is the sum of all risk sources from all links in the transportation route. The following 
steps should be employed to obtain the overall risk along a route of transportation: 
• Summing the risks created by all points on a link, and 
• Summing the risks of all links in the route.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.17. Graphical presentation of the relationships between Link (l), point of release Q(x, y) 
and point of exposure M(x, y). 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.17, a vehicle transporting HazMat is passing through point 
Q(x, y) on link l. As a result, a risk is posed on point M(x, y). In order to calculate the 
annual individual risk (fatalities/year) at M(x, y), the following input data are required: 
 
• Incident frequency. It is a function of the following parameters: Lane number (x1), 
Weather (x2), Surface condition (x3), Alignment (x4), Truck type (y1), Container 
capacity (y2), Container type (y3), and Driver experience (y4). For a given 
transportation activity and a given link, all the parameters are constant, except 
the Weather (x2), which is changing over the year. Therefore, the frequency at 
Link (l) 
M(x, y) 
Q(x, y) 
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point Q(x, y) is a function of the Weather (x2) for given transportation activity. 
Pincident(weather) denotes incident frequency. The number of weather conditions 
is denoted by Nweather, and the probability for each weather condition is Pweather. 
• Outcome probability. If a release occurs following an incident, various outcomes 
caused by different magnitudes of release are possible. The probability of each 
outcome has been estimated using ETA as described in 3.2. The total number of 
outcomes is marked as No, and the probability for each outcome is marked as Po. 
• Fatality. The fatality probability is a function of the consequence and of the 
exposure time (the exposure time is assumed constant for a given consequence 
scenario). The consequence is a function of the nature of the HazMat, type of 
release outcome, weather condition, and wind direction. Therefore, for the 
transportation of a given HazMat, the fatality probability is a function of release 
outcome and the wind direction noted as F(weather, o, w). The number of wind 
directions is noted as Nw, and the probability of each wind direction is Pw. 
 
The individual risk at point M(x, y) caused by the point risk source Q(x, y) is 
calculated by integrating the consequences associated with each wind direction over all 
wind directions, release outcomes, and weather conditions. This individual risk caused 
by a point risk source is known as a point individual risk (PIR): 
[ ]∑ ∑ ∑ ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ××××= weather o w
N N N
woincidentweather PwoweatherFPweatherPPPIR
1 1 1
),,()(   (3.2) 
 73
In the calculation above we assumed that the vehicle is a stationary source 
at ( )yxP , . However, vehicles are in motion, and the effect of the velocity should be 
incorporated into the model. A linear integration along the link, with respect to time (dt), 
will incorporate the component of travel time on the link risk value. The link individual 
risk (LIR) will then have the following form:  
( )∫=
l
dtPIRLIR                (3.3) 
The sum of LIR s along the entire transportation route will represent the total 
individual risk (IR) posed on point M(x, y).  The total individual risk (IR) then can be 
expressed as follows: 
∑
=
= link
N
l
LIRIR
1
  (3.4) 
 
3.7. Societal Risk Analysis 
Societal risk is the risk to a population. It reflects the frequency of health effects 
(usually fatalities) in a specific population, occurring as the result of exposure to a 
specific hazardous material. The societal risk is often expressed in terms of frequency 
distribution of multiple fatalities (f-N curve). The population map for the transportation 
network needs to be defined in order to calculate the societal risk. The population map is 
composed of zones where people are assumed to be uniformly distributed. Aggregation 
centers are points where people are clustered. Zones can have rectangular shape or can 
be linear. Rectangular areas describe the off-route residential quarters, while linear zones 
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represent the road network where motorists are present. Aggregation centers refer to 
particular areas where people are clustered, like schools, hospitals, commercial centers, 
and other similar locations.  
The total number of rectangle zones and the total number of linear zones in the 
network are marked as Nr and Nl, and the uniform population densities are denoted as 
rρ (persons/m2) and lρ (persons/m) respectively. The total number of aggregation 
centers is Nc, and the total number of persons in each center is Pc. 
The number of fatalities in a linear zone is obtained by linear integration (first 
segment of Equation (3.5)) of the fatalities along the line, and it is a function of an 
outcome and a wind direction noted as FL(wind, o, w). In rectangular zones, the number 
of fatalities is obtained by integration (second segment of Equation (3.5)) over the area 
of the rectangle noted as FR(wind, o, w). In an aggregation center, the number of 
fatalities is the fatality probability in the center multiplied by the number of people (third 
segment of Equation (3.5)) in the center noted as FC(wind, o, w). 
The number of fatalities over all zones, caused by a risk source Q(x, y), under 
given release outcome and given wind direction, is calculated as follows: 
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The probability of having N fatalities under a given weather condition, release 
outcome, and wind direction is estimated by Equation (3.6): 
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( ) woweatherincident PPPPwoweatherNF ×××=),,(                                                     (3.6) 
 
By taking into account all wind directions, it is possible to evaluate the 
probability of having Nn (or more) fatalities for given weather condition and release 
outcome: 
( ) [ ]∑ ×= wN nweathern woweatherPoweatherNF
1
),,(),( δ                                               (3.7) 
       Where  
       
( )
⎩⎨
⎧=
,0
,),,( woweatherNF
nδ   
n
n
NwoweatherN
NwoweatherN
<
≥
),,(
),,(
 
 
Considering the motion of the vehicle over all the links and the effects of all 
release outcomes and weather conditions, the probability of having Nn fatalities is 
calculated as follows: 
( )∑ ∑∑∫= weather o LN N N L nn dtoweatherNFNF
1 1 1
),()(                                                           (3.8) 
Equation (3.8) is actually an F-N curve. 
 
3.8. Conclusion on Chapter III 
This chapter has been dedicated to describe the basic modeling technique and 
overall methodology. The basic idea of the proposed methodology is to capture the 
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matching of data/databases availability with TRA techniques and to set up an applicable 
framework to assess transportation risk step by step.  
Risk assessment is a process resulting from the interaction between the 
transportation network, the vehicle or traveling risk source, and the impact area. All our 
risk components, including incident frequency, release probability, consequence 
scenario, and fatality, are carefully observed to determine their contributing factors and 
to figure out the proper data/databases for analysis. Mathematical models and risk 
analysis techniques like ETA are employed for each risk component assessment. 
Numerical models are presented to measure individual risk and societal risk caused by 
HazMat transportation network.  
The overall methodology is developed from available data/databases, which 
makes it an applicable and accountable resource in transportation decision support 
system. This generic method could be applied for most of TRA within the scopes 
described in Section 1.4. Decision makers could modify the methodology when dealing 
with different HazMat. The methodology could be simplified or elaborated further based 
on the requirement of users.   
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CHAPTER IV 
TRA CASE STUDY 
 
 
This chapter does not address all HazMat. It contains two representative case 
studies that use the TRA techniques presented in Chapter III.  
Historical data provide valuable clues to the risks of transporting hazardous 
materials. However, they do not necessarily reflect the actual distribution of risk among 
various hazardous materials because the risks associated with certain materials are 
largely driven by rarely occurring catastrophic events. For example, historical data for 
the past 20 years show that fatalities are more likely to result from events associated with 
the transportation of gasoline and other flammable materials than from other 
transportation incidents. Risk from flammable materials like propane is driven by 
frequently occurring incidents that involve number of injuries and fatalities. These types 
of incidents are called high-probability/low consequence events.  
Transporting toxic-by-inhalation materials poses significantly different risks than 
are associated with transporting propane or other flammable materials. Risks associated 
with toxic materials are strongly influenced by rarely occurring catastrophic incidents, 
such as the rupture of a tank that contains chlorine near a populated area in adverse 
atmospheric conditions. Such incidents are called low-probability/high-consequence 
events.  
 78
Because the historical record contains information on many propane incidents 
and because the maximum potential impacts from an incident involving propane are 
limited, these historical data provide an accurate measure of risk. However, for toxic 
materials, because of strong influence of low-probability events on the overall risk 
profile and because too few incidents have occurred to support statistical 
characterization, experience does not provide an adequate basis for defining toxic 
transportation risks. In this chapter, we illustrate how our methodology is employed for 
these two different cases: propane TRA and chlorine TRA.  
In reality, each study might require over 100 pages of calculations and 
documentation, while here we want to show the performance of our methodology, so 
some assumptions are used besides the exact data, and the assumptions used in an actual 
analysis are situation specific.  
 
4.1. Road Analysis 
The transportation route selected in our case study is sections of US Highway 
290. As explained in Chapter III, the incident data and information on road conditions 
(e.g., number of lanes) are obtained from TTI. The release and consequence scenario 
probabilities are derived from HMIS. The surrounding area information is required to 
measure the societal risk. GIS is employed in our study to characterize the population 
distribution. On a paper map, we cannot peel cities away from countries, or countries 
away from the ocean, but on a GIS map we can. A GIS map is made up of layers, or 
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collections of geographic objects that are alike. To make a map, we can add as many 
layers as we want. 
For our case study purpose, we peel Texas highway information from GIS and 
create the highway layer. A second layer on population distribution is also added to the 
map. Figure 4.1 is the two-layer GIS map for US Highway 290 sections between 
Highway 610 and Highway 6. Population blocks in the map can be characterized by both 
overall population and density. The area of each block is also available in GIS. Dividing 
population data into classes requires we choose both the number of classes and a method 
to determine where one class ends and another begins. 
GIS has six classification methods: natural break, equal interval, defined interval, 
quantile, standard deviation, and manual. Manual method is chosen in our study in order 
to have the same classification as data provided by TTI. Same as TTI data, the 
population distribution is divided into five classes. Figure 4.1 illustrates population 
distribution after classifying the data in the same way as TTI system.  
However, compared with TTI data, the population blocks along Highway 290 are 
not in the same classes. From example, according to TTI, Highway 290 segment that has 
8 lanes has a population class of 9, i.e., the population blocks along the 8-lane segment 
have population of more than 250,000 people, while in GIS, population blocks for that 
part have less than 2,499 people.  We believe the difference is caused because these two 
systems use different areas in define blocks. GIS records more information so that it is 
possible to assess each block in a smaller size.  
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Figure 4.1. GIS map with population block information for Highway 290 surrounding area. 
 
 
Before performing TRA associated with transportation on Highway 290, the 
transportation route needs to be divided into several links. As analyzed in Chapter III, 
unlike incident frequency, release probability, consequence scenario, and consequence 
are affected little by road condition. Incident frequency is a function of Lane number 
(x1), Weather (x2), Population density (x3), Truck configuration (y1), Container capacity 
(y2), and Driver experience (y3). Lane number(x1) and Population density (x3) are road 
features, so the dividing is based on the lane number and population group.  
As shown in Figure 4.1, the selected route can be divided into three parts based 
on the number of lanes. These three parts are denoted as l(1), l(2), and l(3). The 
population groups along l(2) and l(3) are uniform. Two different population groups are 
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associated with l(1). Only  Figure 4.1 black markers separate different links, with each 
link denoted in blue. By referring to the incident frequency calculation in Chapter III, the 
population group does not affect incident frequency much when the number of lanes is 6, 
so we do not divide l(1) further based on population groups. Thus, the selected route is 
divided into three links for risk assessment purpose.  
The notation on population group for each link is defined based on TTI data 
rather than on GIS, because TTI data has been employed therein and it is not necessary 
to spend more time for little improvement of accuracy. Table 4.1 is the definition for 
three links of this transportation route.  
 
Table 4.1 
Link definition 
Link  Number of Lanes Population Group 
l(1) 6 3 
l(2) 8 9 
l(3) 10 9 
 
 
4.2. Propane TRA 
4.2.1. Description 
Propane is one of the nation's most versatile sources of energy and supplies 3 to 4 
percent of our total energy needs. Nearly 11 billion gallons of propane are consumed 
annually in the U.S. by more than 60 million Americans (NPGA, 2005). The situation of 
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concern in this section is that involving the transportation of propane along 
transportation route as highlighted in Figure 4.1. Propane is commonly transported under 
pressure as a flammable liquid which vaporizes rapidly if releases. Table 4.2 describes 
the properties of propane. 
 
Table 4.2 
Properties of propane 
Lower flammable limit  2.1% 
Upper flammable limit 9.5% 
Boiling point -44 oF 
Molecular weight 44.1 
 
 
Two types of trucks are used for propane transportation: a highway transport 
(which typically carries 7,000 to 12,000 gallons) and a smaller bulk delivery truck, 
called a "bobtail" (which carries 1,000 to 5,000+ gallons).  In our case study the 
container capacity is assumed to be 10,000 gallons. One-third of the nation's propane is 
produced in Texas, so the number of trips per year on Highway 290 is assumed to be 
1,000. Table 4.3 describes the specifics associated with this case. 
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4.2.2. Incident Frequency Estimation 
 As detailed in Chapter III, the base incident frequency for these three links in the 
studied route can be assessed by the developed models. Table 4.4 lists the data 
calculated based on the model.  
 
Table 4.3 
Tank truck example description 
Product  Propane 
Contain type  MC331 
Container capacity 10,000 gallons 
Container temperature  70 oF 
Container pressure 125 psia 
Truck type Truck with single trailer 
Trips per year 1,000 
 
Table 4.4 
Incident frequency for different links 
Link Link 
length 
(mile) 
Population 
Group  
Number of 
Lanes 
Weather 
Basic 
Incident 
frequency 
Ultimate 
incident 
frequency 
1 3.1*10-8 4.6*10-8 l(1) 9.7 3 6 
2 8.2*10-8 1.2*10-7 
1 1.5*10-6 2.3*10-6 l(2) 2.4 9 8 
2 4.0*10-6 5.9*10-6 
1 6.8*10-7 1.0*10-6 l(3) 0.9 9 10 
2 1.8*10-6 2.7*10-6 
 84
The modifying parameters are Truck configuration (y1), Container capacity (y2), 
and Driver experience (y3). In this study the modifier associated with driver experience 
is assume to be 1, i.e., the driver has average experience. The other two modifiers are 
assessed from fuzzy models built in Chapter III, and the values of modifiers are 1.39 for 
y2 and 1.07 for y3.  The ultimate incident frequencies for these three links are shown in 
Table 4.4.  
 
4.2.3. Release and Consequence Scenario Analysis 
Since propane is flammable, flammability hazards and the potential for 
explosions must be addressed in the consequence analysis. As discussed in CCPS 
(1995), BLEVE is not a typical outcome unless there is a secondary source of fuel. Only 
consequences related with flammability are considered. The release probability and 
consequence scenarios have been analyzed in the example shown in Chapter III. Nine 
different consequence scenarios result after the release of propane from the tank. Torch 
fires/flash fires consequence resulting after propane releases have different dimensions 
and affect different areas, which are closely related with the release scenario. The 
probabilities of different consequence scenarios were derived from ETA.  
 
4.2.4. Consequence Simulation 
The consequence caused by each of these scenarios is simulated using 
CANARY. For all of these hazards, the concern of study is the fatalities caused by heat 
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flux. Table 4.5 is the CANARY output for heat flux of the center line along wind 
direction. Figure 4.2 shows the radiation flux vs. distance in the targeted ground level. 
The heat fluxes for other scenarios are simulated in the same way. With the 
changing of release orifice size, the heat flux along the wind direction also changes. The 
smaller the orifice, the less the heat flux at the same distance from the release source.  
 
Table 4.5 
Heat flux at the center line along wind direction vs. distance 
Downwind Distance  (feet)             Flux  (Btu/hr-sq.ft) 
16.4                 4723 
18.1                 4689 
20.0                 4611 
22.1                 4484 
24.4                 4302 
26.9                 4066 
29.8                 3775 
32.9                 3439 
36.3                 3068 
40.1                 2678 
44.3                 2289 
48.9                 1918 
54.0                 1579 
59.6                 1280 
65.9                 1026 
72.7                  815 
80.3                  644 
88.7                  507 
98.0                  398 
108.2                  312 
Downwind Distances to Endpoints  
24.4                 4300 
53.2                 1600 
89.2                  500 
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Figure 4.2. Radiation flux vs. distance in the targeted ground level. 
 
 
4.2.5. Risk Estimation  
The point individual risk is estimated by Equation (3.2). After obtaining all the 
probabilities present in the equation, the only missing item is the Fatality. These data are 
obtained from probit correlations. The fatality associated with flash fire is caused by heat 
radiation. The probit correlation for burn deaths from flash fire is (Crowl, 2002): 
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( )VY ln56.29.14 ×+−=   (4.1) 
 43
4
10ee ItV =  
 et = effective time duration (s) 
 eI  = effective radiation intensity (W/m
2) 
 
To assess the individual risk, the observed point has to be defined in the network 
first, i.e., at that point a person is supposed to be stationed there for a whole year. The 
fatality probability of that individual is the individual risk for that point.  
This point M is chosen to be located in the highlighted block as shown in Figure 
4.1, because this point is next to l(2) whose incident frequency is a little bit larger than 
the other two. The distance of point M to l(2) is 30 feet. That is a reasonable distance for 
individuals to be stationed, and at that distance the heat flux is still high enough for 
worst scenario analysis.  
Figure 4.3 shows that the wind direction does not affect the heat flux much at a 
distance of 30 feet. So the wind direction is not considered any more. When weather is 
in class 1, and the consequence scenario is flash fire occurring after rupture, the heat flux 
is assessed to be 3775 Btu/hr.ft2. The effective time duration is supposed to be 60 
seconds. Then the probit under such conditions is calculated to be 4.005 according to 
Equation (4.1). The corresponding fatality probability is 10.6% (Crowl, 2002).  
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Figure 4.3. Flare radiation isopleths. 
 
 
Since the consequence scenario is flash fire, fatality is not supposed to occur 
when  weather condition is rainy, so only one weather condition is taken into account in 
the risk assessment. Without considering weather and wind condition in Equation (3.2), 
only fatalities associated with all other consequence scenarios need to be measured to get 
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the point individual risk, but the vapor distribution is not included in the calculation.  
Fatalities for other consequence scenarios are listed in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 
Fatalities caused by different scenarios 
Consequence scenario obtained from ETA Fatality (%) 
P1  10.6 
P2 10.6 
P4 1 
P5 1 
P7 <1 
P8 <1 
 
 
The overall point individual risk is calculated to be: 
( )( )
milevehicledeath
incident
death
milevehicle
incident
oFPPPPIR
ON
Oincidentweather
•×=
××•××=
×××=
−
−
∑
11
56-
1
106.7
105.3102.395.0  (4.2) 
 
 The link risk is to integrate the point risk through the whole link. Usually, when 
the heat flux is less than 500 Btu/hr.ft2 (1,562W/m2), we will not consider its effect on 
fatality. According to CANARY output shown in Table 4.5, the heat flux meets this 
level at distance of 89.2 ft. Thus only these points on link (2) whose distance to M is less 
than 89.2 ft are considered to contribute link risk. This requirement results in a 
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contributing segment whose length is 168 feet. To simplify the calculation, each point is 
assumed to create the same risk to point M, thus the link risk is calculated to be:  
vehicledeath
ft
mileft
milevehicle
death
lPIRLIR
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11
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1168106.7
−
−
×=
××•
×=
×=
 (4.3) 
  
Considering the trips per year, the overall risks to an individual in a year is: 
yeardeath
year
vehicle
vehicle
death
TripLIRRIR
9
12
104.2
1000104.2
−
−
×=
××=
×=
 (4.4) 
  
This result illustrates that the transportation risk associated with propane 
transportation does not result in high risk level if people are 30 feet away from the 
highway. The same method is utilized to assess risk caused at other point in the network. 
When people are very near to the transportation route, the risk could be very high due to 
the high heat flux of flash fire. 
 
 
4.3. Chlorine TRA  
4.3.1. Description 
Chlorine is a toxic gas that has a pungent suffocating odor. It is extremely toxic 
by inhalation and is heavier than air. Container for transporting chlorine on highway is 
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MC331, which is the same as propane. To compare risk caused by chlorine with that of 
propane, the chlorine shipment condition is chosen similar to propane transportation. 
Table 4.7 summarizes the shipment information through the route highlighted in Figure 
4.1.  As addressed in Chapter III, the incident frequency is affected by road condition, 
truck/container configuration, environmental condition, and driver status. The type of 
HazMat affects the incident frequency little, and if there is any, it is because the type of 
HazMat requires the change of these four, especially the first three kinds of parameters. 
Therefore, the data on incident frequency along the highlighted route in Figure 4.1 are 
assessed in the same way as shown in Section 4.2.2.  
 
Table 4.7 
Chlorine shipment on Highway 290 
Product  Propane 
Contain type  MC331 
Container capacity 10,000 gallons 
Container temperature  70 oF 
Container pressure 105 psia 
Truck type Truck with single trailer 
Trips per year 1,000 
 
 
4.3.2. Release and Consequence Scenario Analysis 
According to the Chlorine Institute (2003), chlorine production averaged 10.5 
million tons per year in the U.S. over the 1979-1987 period, and there were an estimated 
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60,000 to 90,000 separate sites in the U.S. using chlorine. There were also 
approximately one million containers of chlorine shipped each year in the U.S. including 
barges, railroad tank cars, tank trucks, ton containers, and 100 and 150 pound cylinders. 
Since 1989, there have been approximately 50,000 shipments per year of chlorine in 90-
ton rail tank car. Rail is the most common transportation mode for chlorine shipment.  
According to HMIS, there were 7 incidents associated with chlorine 
transportation from 1993 to 2002. The lack of enough data makes it impossible to 
employ the method presented in Chapter III to assess the release probability and 
consequence scenario. On the other hand, most of these chlorine highway incidents were 
related to non-bulk container, so the chlorine incident information recorded in HMIS is 
not within our research scope.  
In this research we assume the conditional release probability of chlorine upon 
the occurrence of an incident is the same as that of propane. This assumption is based on 
the similarities in container type and condition. For both propane and chlorine, MC331 is 
the mainly used container, both of them are liquefied gas, and they are under similar 
high pressure during transportation process. Based on this reason, the probabilities for 
rupture, puncture, and leakage are also assumed the same as those of propane.  
 
4.3.3. Consequence Simulation 
No matter what the release size, the consequence scenarios associated with 
chlorine are the toxic vapor dispersion and potential fatalities or injuries and 
environment damage. The toxic vapor dispersion is modeled using CANARY. For 
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rupture scenario, the release is assumed to be continuous, and the release time is 10 min, 
which is used as operator’s response time in risk management. CANARY output shows 
that the ground level concentration is 5*105 ppm at 30 ft downwind distance.  
 
The probit correlation on chlorine toxic death is (Crowl, 2002): 
( )VY ln69.11.17 ×+−=  (4.5) 
∑= TCV 75.2  
C = concentration (ppm) 
T = time interval (min) 
 
The time interval is assumed to be 10 min, same as the usual response time. Point 
M is at 30 feet away from release source and in wind direction; the death probability for 
individual at that point is 100%. For puncture release and leakage scenario, the fatality is 
calculated to be 100% as well.  
 
4.3.4. Risk Estimation  
The calculation of point risk requires the probability distributions of weather 
class, consequence scenario, and wind direction. However, CANARY does not have the 
capacity to assess the vapor dispersion under rain climate, so the weather effect is 
neglected here. There are three consequence scenarios corresponding to three different 
release scenarios, but the fatalities associated with all scenarios are 100%. Therefore it is 
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not necessary to consider each scenario’s probability. The wind direction varies 
throughout a year. For conservative analysis, in this research we use 90% as the 
probability of wind directing toward individual at point M. The point risk is equal to: 
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The Time Weighted Average (TWA) for chlorine is 0.5. According to CANARY 
output for rupture release consequence, the distance of vapor dispersed is 30,000 feet 
(5.7 mile) before the concentration becomes less than 0.5 ppm. That is, when chlorine 
truck is passing a certain segment in this route, fatality could be caused, but beyond that 
segment, transportation cannot cause fatality at point M. The length of that segment is 
11.4 mile. Here we assume M is located in such a way that all links in that segment are 
as those shown in Table 4.8. Part of l(1) next to Highway 6 does not contribute the risk 
caused at point M.  
 
Table 4.8 
Links characterization for risk assessment 
Link  Link length (mile) Ultimate incident frequency 
l(1) 8.1 4.6*10-8 
l(2) 2.4 2.3*10-6 
l(3) 0.9 1.0*10-6 
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Each link risk (LIR) is to integrate point risk along that link. Point risk should be 
assessed for every point in the link. For simplifying the process, here we use the uniform 
point risk to derive the route risk (RIR). By considering the trips per year, the risk 
associated with this route is: 
yeardeath
year
vehicle
vehicle
death
LPIRTripRIR
4
8
107.5
4.111000100.5
−
−
×=
×××=
××=
 (4.7) 
 
4.4. Comparison between Propane and Chlorine Transportation 
Because of strong influence of low-probability events on the overall risk profile 
and because too few incidents have occurred to support statistical characterization, 
experience does not provide an adequate basis for defining toxic transportation risks. 
The fact that the number of deaths and injuries for any given decades is small does not 
necessarily mean that the risk is small. Rather, it may reflect the good fortune that no 
large toxic releases have occurred near population area. As a result, the number of 
injuries or fatalities in a given time period can differ substantially from an average based 
on the distribution of possible incidents that accounts for low-probability/high-
consequence events.  
These terms of low probability and high probability are proposed in respect to the 
amount of material transported. The more popular usage and shipment of propane draws 
the conception that propane is much easier to result in incident or fatality than chlorine. 
However, causing more incidents does not mean the incident frequency is higher or the 
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transportation is more dangerous. The high number of incidents associated with propane 
transportation is mainly due to the large amount of trips. If all the transportation 
conditions (e.g., container type, container capacity, truck configuration) are the same for 
both propane and chlorine, the vehicles will have the same probability to be involved in 
transportation incidents in a trip.  
The consequence of toxic materials and flammable materials are very different. 
The heat radiation of flash/torch fire decreases rapidly with distance, and the exposure to 
that heat radiation is not lethal if the individual is not too close to the release source. 
However, the fatality is very high if the individual is exposed to even small amounts of 
chlorine. Therefore, the consequence would be severe if large amount of chlorine is 
released in the transportation.  
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CHAPTER V 
OPTIMUM ROUTING METHODOLOGY 
 
 
TRA aims at providing baseline for risk management on HazMat transportation 
activities. To reduce the risk associated with the handling of HazMat, it is important to 
develop risk management systems that involve procedures and actions for supporting 
strategic, tactical, and operational decisions that aim in reducing risk. such a risk 
management system is also called decision support system for risk management 
decisions, and it must be developed based on TRA results and take into consideration the 
transportation characteristics.  
Risk could be mitigated by the implementation of incident prevention actions, 
i.e., (i) judicious selection of route, (ii) alteration of vehicle/container design to reduce 
release severity, and (iii) improvement of driver training to reduce incident probability. 
In this chapter, network routing methodologies are addressed to provide risk mitigation 
tools for decision makers and to illustrate the importance of TRA in decision support 
system.  
 
5.1. Background 
The routing of HazMat operations is a complex, multiobjective problem 
involving environmental, engineering, economic, and political concerns. When 
 98
considering the simplest deterministic case, Abkowitz and Cheng (1988) and many other 
authors proposed to solve the routing problems by employing the classic shortest path 
algorithm. It involves finding the route from an origin to a destination which minimizes 
a single measure. The measure must be additive across links. The risk draws much 
concern as well as cost to be used as the measure. However, the methodologies did not 
explicitly consider the tradeoff between risks and cost. List and Mirchandani (1991) 
analyzed tradeoff between risk & cost. Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2004), Iakovou 
(2001), and List and Mirchandani (1991) proposed bi-objective models to address the 
effects of both cost and risk in routing decision.  
In some cases the bi-objective model causes problems to decision makers, i.e., 
combining both the transportation cost and risk is hard for the decision makers to 
determine weights that would make such a combination meaningful; it is also hard to 
choose the weights that would differentiate equitably between the risk and the transport 
cost for the entire network.  
Perceived risk reflects more the opinions of individuals or groups and is greatly 
influenced by feelings, perceptions, and emotions toward a specific problem. In our 
study, two optimum models are presented by taking account of decision makers’ 
perception and avoiding the tradeoffs between cost and risk. The optimum models could 
be developed and solved in optimization software LINGO.  
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5.2. Fuzzy Logic Optimum Routing Model  
5.2.1. Fuzzy Sets on Risk and Cost 
Many existing mathematical models indirectly address aspects of human 
perception in the decision making process. Yet, none of these models has an effective 
method of measuring the public's perceptions and incorporating these perceptions into 
the strict mathematical framework required by optimization techniques. Fuzzy logic 
provides one way of directly integrating perceptions.  
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 depict the linear fuzzy sets used to represent the 
public's acceptance of any policy with respect to the cost and risk associated with that 
option. If a policy option has zero risk, its acceptability with respect to risk, μr, is unity. 
As risk exceeds the value Br, the acceptability decreases linearly to zero at Br’. A similar 
fuzzy membership function is used for acceptability with respect to cost. The 
mathematical expression of the fuzzy risk membership function depicted in Figure 5.1 is: 
( )
r
rr
r S
BRiskS −−≤μ   (5.1) 
Similarly, a fuzzy cost constraint is formulated as: 
( )
c
cc
c S
BCostS −−≤μ   (5.2) 
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Figure 5.1. Linear risk fuzzy membership function. 
 
 
                     
Figure 5.2. Linear cost fuzzy membership function. 
 
5.2.2. Fuzzy Logic Optimum Model Setup 
For model setup, perceptions on risk and cost are incorporated into the model 
using fuzzy sets. A single, non-controversial, non-fuzzy objective function is formulated 
Br’ Br 
Sr 
0 
μr 
1 
Bc’ Bc 
Sc 
0 
μc 
1 
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while all fuzzy sets are represented as constraints. In this manner, the algorithm can be 
used to arrive at a solution that optimizes the objective function subject to the fuzzy 
constraints as well as the physical constraints governing the transport and HazMat.  
The network needs to be defined a little bit in routing process different than in 
the TRA process. The characterization process is shown in the following part.  
• Network G={N, L} 
• Link (i, j): from node i to node j 
l (i, j): length of link (i, j) 
C (i, j): link cost;   R (i, j): link risk 
T (i, j): number of trucks traveling on link (i, j) 
Cap (i, j): capacity of link (i, j) 
• Node (i) 
b(i): truck’s supply or demand 
b(i)>0 for supply nodes, <0 for demand nodes, =0 for other nodes 
 
All the above parameters are known or could be determined directly by users 
except the capacity of link (i, j). It is determined by combing the risk acceptance and the 
risk associated with the link. The Dutch government has general risk criteria for fixed 
facility, which is the individual risk less than 10-6. This criterion is implemented in 
transportation decisions in our study. Since transportation risk is additive,  the individual 
risk caused by each link, R(i, j) should be less than 10-6 to ensure that the overall risk 
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associated with the whole transportation route can meet this criterion. Thus the capacity 
of link is determined as:  
( ) ( )jiRjiCap ,
10,
6−
=   (5.3) 
The objective is to maximize the overall acceptability of the routing solution with 
respect to cost and risk. Mathematically, this objective is expressed as 
cr μμ +=max   (5.4) 
This objective function is subject to several mathematical constraints that are 
necessary to physically define the HazMat transportation problems: 
• Mass balance for node  
• Link capacity constraint for each link  
• Fuzzy membership function for total cost and risk 
 
The first constraint ensures that all the HazMat originating at the origin is 
transported though the transportation route and delivered to the destination, and the 
truck’s supply and demand in the intermediate nodes are 0. The constraint is expressed 
as: 
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The second constraint guarantees the truck transport capacity for each link. The 
number of trucks passing through each link can not exceed the capacity of that link. By 
this way the risk associated with this segment is guaranteed not beyond the risk 
acceptance level.  
( ) ( )jiCapjiT ,,0 ≤≤  (5.6) 
The acceptability of the policy includes acceptability with respect to both cost 
and risk. The overall cost reflects the total cost of transporting HazMat. Mathematically, 
the cost is defined as: 
( )
( )
( )jiCjiTCost
Aji
,,
,
×= ∑
∈
 (5.7) 
The acceptance level to cost is defined in Equation (5.1).  
The overall policy risk also reflects the total risk associated with the HazMat 
transportation. Assuming independence, this objective is mathematically defined as: 
( )
( )
( )jiRjiTRisk
Aji
,,
,
×= ∑
∈
 (5.8) 
The acceptance level to cost is defined in Equation (5.2).  
Solutions to this model formulation completely specify the routing strategy 
corresponding to the maximum acceptance. The model solutions are governed by the 
physical constraints defining the routing process and driven by overall risk and cost 
considerations. The solution could be obtained from optimization software LINGO once 
all data are input to the model.  
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5.3. Alternative Users’ Determiner Optimum Model 
Fuzzy logic optimum model presented in Section 5.2 is a good routing approach 
when users already have the perception towards the risk and cost associated with 
HazMat transportation and the acceptance levels of risk and cost can be changed to some 
degree.  
However, if the decision makers already have a concept about the exact data of 
maximum acceptable risk, the model presented above needs to be modified to meet 
users’ demand. In this section, the optimum route under given risk tolerance is selected 
based on an alternative optimum model.  
Since the maximum acceptable risk has been defined by users, the objective 
function in the model is only the cost associated with the transportation activity: 
( )
( )
( )jiCjiTCost
Aji
,,min
,
×== ∑
∈
  (5.9) 
The constraints to the objective function include: 
• Risk constraint set by decision maker 
• Mass balance for each node i 
• Link capacity constraint for link (i, j) 
 
The first constraint is defined by decision makers regarding the acceptance of 
risk: 
( )
( )
( ) int
,
,, constra
Aji
RjiRjiTRisk ≤×= ∑
∈
   (5.10) 
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Here intconstraR  is given by decision maker.  
The constraints on mass balance and link capacity are the same as those 
described in Section 5.2.  
After the setup of the model, the optimum route can be obtained by using LINGO 
to get the solution to the input model. With the change of risk acceptance level, different 
routes can be utilized to ensure the minimum cost. The decision makers can thenchoose 
the optimum routes based on their own requirements for acceptable risk level. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LNG TRANSPORTATION CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS* 
 
 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) plays an increasingly important role in the natural 
gas industry and energy markets. Taking the U.S market as example, industry analysts 
predict that LNG imports could increase to 5% of the total U. S. gas supply by 2007 
(California Energy Commission, 2003). Marine transportation of LNG has been carried 
out with a very good safety record since 1959 (Otterman, 1975; ABS, 2004). However, 
the risks associated with LNG have been debated for decades. After September 11, 2001 
there is a heightened sense of concern over the potential for terrorist attacks on LNG 
tankers. No LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility has been attacked by terrorists. 
However, similar natural gas and oil facilities have been favored terror targets 
internationally. In October 2002, the French oil tanker Limberg was attacked off the 
Yemeni coast by a bomb-laden boat (Parfomak, 2003). The combination of recent 
interest in expanding or building new facilities to receive LNG carriers, along with 
increased awareness and concern about potential terrorist action, has raised questions 
about the potential consequences of incidents involving LNG marine transportation. 
                                                 
* Portions of this chapter reprinted with permission from “Assessment of the effects of 
release variables on the consequences of LNG spillage onto water using FERC models” 
by Qiao, Y., West, H., Mannan, M., Johnson, D., and Cornwell, J., 2006. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, in press. Copyright (2006) by Elsevier; “LNG-water rapid phase 
transition: A literature review” by West, H., Qiao, Y., and Mannan, M., 2005.  LNG 
Journal, May, 21-24. Copyright (2005). 
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The major hazards of an LNG spill on water include: 
 
• Pool fires: If LNG spills near an ignition source, the evaporating gas in a 
combustible gas-air concentration will burn above the LNG pool (Methane, the 
main component of LNG, burns in gas-to-air ratios between 5% and 15%). The 
resulting pool fire would spread as the LNG pool expanded away from its source 
and continued evaporating.  
• Flammable vapor clouds: If LNG spills but does not immediately ignite, the 
evaporating natural gas will form a vapor cloud that may drift some distance 
from the spill site. If the cloud subsequently encounters an ignition source, those 
portions of the cloud with a combustible gas-air concentration would burn. The 
vapor cloud fire would burn its way back to the LNG spill where the vapors 
originated and then continue to burn as a pool fire.  
• Rapid phase transition or flameless explosion: The phenomenon of rapid vapor 
formation with concomitant loud “bangs” has been observed when LNG was 
released on water. This non-flaming physical interaction is referred to as “rapid 
phase transition (RPT)” or “flameless explosion.” West, Qiao, and Mannan (2005) 
believe that the rapid phase transition will not propagate into a significantly 
larger damage scenario. 
• Confined space explosions: If significant confinement of the vapor cloud occurs 
after an accidental LNG release, damaging overpressures (explosion) may occur. 
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In the first part of this chapter LNG-water RPT is analyzed and previous 
experiments and theoretical work on RPT are reviewed. In the second part we will focus 
on the flammable vapor clouds dispersion process. The related processes, including LNG 
spillage and pool spread and evaporation, will also be considered. The effects of tank 
conditions, release scenarios and environmental conditions on the LNG spillage, spread 
and dispersion processes will be evaluated.  
 
6.1. Rapid Phase Transition 
In addition to a fire and/or explosion hazard when natural gas is mixed with air, 
there is the possibility of a low temperature, non-chemical interaction of the LNG with 
water. This type of interaction is often referred to as flameless vapor explosion, or as 
RPT as used herein. RPT takes place when a liquid rapidly changes phase to vapor. The 
large increase in volume causes a localized pressure increase, which can give rise to an 
air or waterborne boom. Though RPT results in shock waves, it is less powerful than 
what one usually associates with a chemical explosion.  
   A report by Burgess, Murphy, and Zabetakis (1970) provided the impetus for 
efforts of many investigators in this field.  After September 11, 2001, this issue is under 
focus again due to the consideration of homeland security issues. No LNG tanker or 
land-based LNG facility has been attacked by terrorists. However, similar natural gas 
and oil facilities have been favored terror targets internationally. Two occurrences have 
been addressed by Parfomak a report for Congress (Parfomak, 2003).  
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    In this chapter the incidents and experiments of LNG-water RPT are reviewed. 
Theoretical analysis about the LNG RPT mechanism and quantitative LNG RPT damage 
assessments are presented. Conclusions are drawn based on literature review and the 
available theoretical/quantitative analysis results.  
    Most of the LNG RPT work was reviewed here; however, since some 
experimental results were never published, and many of the comments result from 
informal, but not proprietary sources, such a review is undoubtedly incomplete, but it is 
considered that the basic facts presented in this article are correct.  
 
6.1.1. Accidents Analysis and Experimental Results 
    The earliest reported observations of LNG RPT on water were made by Constock 
Liquid Methane Corporation at Bayou Long, Louisiana in 1956. LNG was intermittently 
pumped with flow rates of 0.23 m3/min maintained for periods of several days and on 
short occasions exceeded 0.95 m3/minute for a period of several hours. It is estimated 
that about 3785 m3 of LNG were spilled in a period of about 3 months during which 3 or 
4 very audible eruptions, loud enough to be heard 402 m away, occurred. Since none of 
these RPTs damaged standard window glass panes erected for these tests less than 15.2 
m from the spill area, it was concluded that this phenomenon was unlikely to constitute a 
hazard.  
    On April 26, 1959, Constock Methane conducted jettison tests at sea in which 
18.5 m3 of LNG were pumped overboard in a period of 7 minutes. No audible eruptions 
were reported.  
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       Tokyo Gas had conducted over 1000 small scale tests, starting in 1967, and the 
work has been addressed by Nakanishi and Reid (1971) and Burgess, Biordi, ad Murphy 
(1972) ,. The LNG quantities were 0.0012 or 0.0024 m3. Although they observed small 
pops near the end of the evaporation of the spill, they never encountered a violent 
eruption or RPT. 
    In 1968 and 1969, the U. S. Bureau of Mines Safety Research Center conducted a 
series of tests on spilling LNG on water (Burgess and Murphy, 1970). One set of tests 
consisted of dumping 0.0038 to 0.0076 m3 of LNG on 0.0189 m3 of water or brine 
contained in an aquarium of 0.0566 m3 capacity. 54 such tests were conducted with 
water followed by 2 tests with brine on the second of which RPT occurred which 
shattered the aquarium. Another series of 12 tests consisted of spilling 0.00378 to 0.472 
m3 of LNG on an artificial pond. In one of these tests, scheduled to be a 0.265 m3 test, 
RPT occurred within an eighth of a second after the spill bucket had been tripped; it was 
estimated that at most 0.0945 m3 were spilled. One observer standing on shore compared 
the RPT to a stick of dynamite. These noise observations are not a reliable indication of 
energy release as noted later in Section . 
    Subsequently, the Bureau conducted about 40 spills of LNG, totaling 1.13 m3, on 
their artificial pond with no instances of visible or audible RPTs (Burgess, Biordi, and 
Murphy, 1972). In addition, they performed tests using other hydrocarbons and variable 
compositions of LNG. In some cases weak RPTs, probably comparable to the one that 
shattered the aquarium, have been reproduced.    
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  Experiments were conducted by Garland and Atkinson (1971) at the University 
of Maryland.  Small amounts (5-20 ml) of LNG were dropped onto water, water/organic 
liquid mixtures, or, in certain cases, one-component organic liquid. No RPT was 
observed during all of those tests. When larger amounts of LNG (10-100ml) were 
poured onto a liquid mixture consisting of a 1 mm film of Hexane on 100 ml water, RPT 
occurred every time.  
    Esso Research Laboratories in New Jersey carried out tests during 1971, and the 
results were reviewed by Atallah (1997) and the LNG Research Center, MIT (1977). As 
found in other tests, pouring LNG on top of water did not lead to RPT.  However, when 
LNG was poured into a dry container and allowed to evaporate until only a foam 
remained, upon suddenly adding water to the foam, RPTs were produced which on 
occasion ruptured the container. Continental Oil Company had observed a similar 
phenomenon in their “dry- bucket” experiments in 1965 and 1971. Esso has since 
conducted numerous other tests including dumping LNG on liquids other than water. 
Weak RPT was sometimes noted if 3% sodium chloride salt solutions were employed. If 
LNG was poured on pentane or hexane, RPT was still observed.  
    A related test program was carried out by Nakanishi and Reid (1971) at MIT. No 
evidence of RPT was noted throughout the process for the small scale spills of LNG on 
cold or hot water. When, however, 10 to 100 ml of LNG was spilled on hexane, RPT 
occurred with a violent crack-like noise and the residual LNG was thrown violently out 
of the Dewar flask. RPT also occurred when LNG was spilled on water coated by 
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hexane usually 1 to 2 second after the start, though occasionally a delay of 5 to 10 
second was noted.  
    Beginning in 1970, the research laboratories of Shell Pipeline Company in 
Houston conducted about 300 laboratory tests consisting of spills from 30 ml to 6 l of 
cryogens on water (Enger and Hartman, 1972a). Weak RPT or pops occurred within one 
to two minutes after the spillage of LNG. The higher the temperature of the water, the 
less elapsed evaporation time was required for the pops to occur. Presumably, these pops 
are related to the persistence of the Leidenfrost film boiling into a metastable region, 
which ultimately terminates explosively in the transition boiling regime as demonstrated 
by Baumeistor, Hendrick, and Hamill (1966). 
    Shell has reported their work on larger spill tests. Reproducible RPT was 
obtained only with weathered LNG containing less than 40 percent methane (Enger and 
Hartman, 1972b). 
    LNG Research Center, MIT (1977) finished a report under contract to American 
Gas Association. Spills were made with six pure hydrocarbons on water and other fluids. 
RPT occurred under certain substrate temperatures for most of the spilled liquid-
substrate pairs. At temperatures less than those necessary for RPT, there was generally 
nucleate boiling and sometimes the substrate froze. At temperatures above the RPT, film 
boiling took place. Five binary hydrocarbon mixtures of ethane or ethene with a heavier 
hydrocarbon were studied with water as the only substrate. RPT was observed for every 
binary system under certain temperatures. If RPT did not occur, ice always formed 
rapidly.    
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  In 1980 the Burro series were conducted by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) primarily to study vapor cloud dispersion (Koopman, et. al., 1982). 
The spill volume ranged from 24 to 39 m3, the spill rate from 11.3 to 18.4 m3/min. 
Energetic RPT explosions, though not expected, did occur during the Burro 6 and 9 tests. 
In test 9 the most severe RPT event produced blast overpressure of 0.05 bar measured at 
distance of about 30 m. The air-blast TNT equivalents of the observed RPTs were 
calculated from peak overpressures measured at known distances from the spill point. By 
this calculation the surface shock wave reflection produces an overestimate of the 
explosive energy by a factor of 1.8. In earlier reports the surface reflection reduction was 
not imposed. The maximum TNT equivalent was originally calculated to be equal to 6.3 
kg by Koopman et. al. (1982). After considering the surface reflection reduction, 
Goldwire et. al. (1983) and McRae, Goldwire, and Koopman (1984) estimated the 
maximum TNT equivalence for Burro test RPT explosion was 3.5 kg. It is most notable 
in Burro test 9 that RPT damaged the spill plate and spill pipe support structures.  
    In 1981 the Coyote series tests were performed in order to further study the RPT 
explosions (Goldwire et. al., 1983; McRae, Goldwire, and Koopman, 1984). Thirteen 
spills of 3-14 m3 with flow rates of 6-19 m3/min were performed with fuel of varying 
ratios of methane, propane and ethane.  Five spills of 8-28 m3 with flow rates of 14-17 
m3/min were also performed to obtain dispersion and combustion data. Six of the 
eighteen spills produced RPT explosions. The maximum overpressure measured at 
distance of 24.3 m from the spill source was 0.09 bar, which was estimated to have 
maximum TNT equivalence of 5.5 kg if the surface reflection reduction was not imposed 
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(Goldwire et. al., 1983; McRae, Goldwire, and Koopman, 1984). After imposing the 
surface reflection reduction effect, the maximum TNT equivalence was estimated to be 
3.0 kg . However, the maximum TNT equivalence of 5.4 kg and 6.3 kg ware noted by 
Atallah (1997) and Sandia (2004) respectively. Based on the LLNL report, which should 
be the most reliable source since they were published by the laboratory that conducted 
the Coyote series tests, the maximum TNT equivalence noted in the Sandia report may 
not account for the surface reflection reduction effect, while the data provided by Atallah 
may come from Burro tests rather than Coyote tests.  
    In 1980 LNG tests were conducted at Maplin Sands, England by the National 
Maritime Institute to obtain dispersion and thermal radiation data on 20 spills of LNG 
and 14 spills of propane onto water (Blackmore, Eyre, and Summers, 1982). The 
maximum spill size of 20 m3 was chosen for the experiments, both of LNG and 
refrigerated propane. RPTs were observed in one of the instantaneous LNG spills, and it 
is believed that the barge was damaged by the series of RPTs (Sandia, 2004). 
    Gaz de France has done a lot of research in this area (Gabillard, Dahlsveen, and 
Cronin,1996; Cleaver, Dahlsveen, and Heiersted, 1998; Nedelka, Sauter, Goanvic, and 
Ohba, 2003). In 1981, Gaz de France performed continuous spillages of LNG onto the 
sea at Lorient, France, with flow-rates up to 50 m3/h to reproduce the conditions of an 
LNG leakage from a loading/unloading arm. In a partnership with Shell Research in 
1982 and with British Gas in 1984, complete ruptures of a loading/unloading arm were 
simulated during 28 instantaneous spillages of volumes between 1 and 9 m3. The 
maximum RPT recorded was evaluated to be equivalent to 4.15 kg of TNT (Nedelka, 
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Sauter, Goanvic, and Ohba, 2003). However, the maximum measured overpressure and 
the corresponding distance to the source was not specified by Sandia (2004), Blackmore, 
Eyre, and Summers (1982) or Gabillard, Dahlsveen, and Cronin (1996), so that it is hard 
to evaluate the validity of the TNT equivalence data.  
    In 1987 the Falcon tests were conducted at Frenchman Flat in Nevada by LLNL 
(Shin, Meroney, and Neff, 1991). The Falcon tests were also addressed by Sandia (2004). 
The testing was performed on a 40 by 60 m pond, enclosed by an 88 m long by 44 m 
wide by 9.1 m high vapor fence. A 22 m wide by 13.7 m high barrier was erected 
upwind of the pond, in order to simulate the obstruction of a storage tank. Five tests 
were performed with spill rates of 8.7-30.3 m3/min (20.6-66.4 m3), and methane 
concentrations of 88-94.7%.  Large RPT explosions occurred approximately 60 seconds 
after the spill, and a fireball started inside the vapor fence at 81 seconds for Falcon test 
#5, which had a spill rate of 30.3 m3/min, total volume of 43.9 m3, and methane content 
of 88%. RPT also occurred with Falcon 3, with a spill rate of 18.9 m3/min, total volume 
of 50.7 m3, and methane content of 91%.  
    The Falcon test is significant because it is the only case where RPT was 
considered an ignition source. However, there are two theories. One theory claims 
sufficient energy release to cause methane ignition, whilst the other theory suggests an 
aerosol formation, which then ignited surrounding gas by an electrostatic mechanism. 
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 6.1.2. Hot Liquid-Water RPT   
    To explore the mechanism of RPT, some investigators also tried to use other 
liquid-liquid systems that can interact similar to the LNG/Hydrocarbons-water system. 
For example, Anderson and Armstrong at the Argonne National Laboratory worked on 
water-molten NaCl and Sodium-molten UO2 systems to produce RPT with well-defined 
fluid geometry (Anderson and Armstrong, 1973).  
    In retrospect, the violent interaction of LNG with water is probably quite similar 
to the steam explosions that have been observed for many years in almost every industry 
where very hot liquids are handled such as the aluminum, copper, paper (soda and Kraft 
smelt), nuclear, and the iron and steel industries. A critical review of these physical 
explosions, including a postulated mechanism and a mathematical model, has been 
published by Genco and Lemmon (1970). Although this work constitutes an excellent 
frame of reference for analyzing the consequences of such explosions, their 
mathematical model is not directly applicable to the LNG-water eruptions, particularly 
with respect to the scale-up parameters.  
    A significant point of difference between the liquid metal-water explosions and 
the LNG-water combination is that the former can be reproduced consistently in the 
laboratory at conditions comparable to those encountered in actual practice. On the other 
hand, as is evident from the summaries in the preceding paragraphs, LNG-water RPT 
can be reproduced with any degree of consistency only when the experimental variables 
and procedures are carefully controlled under conditions which are not likely to be 
encountered in actual practice. It is also significant to note that despite the occurrence of 
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explosions in these other industries under conditions of actual practice, they have 
continued to operate in a relatively safe and prudent manner.  
 
6.1.3. The Audible Pop Phenomenon 
It is essential to recognize clearly that two separate phenomena have been 
observed under the category of LNG-water eruptions: (1) the audible burst or pop, and (2) 
RPT. These two phenomena have at least one element in common in that superheating of 
the LNG is a contributing factor, which culminates in an eruption, although of different 
magnitudes, in both instances. However, beyond this premise, the detailed mechanisms 
leading to the RPT could conceivably be different since the elapsed time differs by at 
least three orders of magnitude (about a factor of a thousand) for these two phenomena. 
For example, in the small-scale Shell experiments, which have also been observed by 
others, an elapsed time of about 75 to 125 seconds was required to achieve a pop after 
LNG  (usually around 30 ml) at –161 °C was poured onto water (or brine) having an 
initial temperature of 15 °C to 86 °C. The shorter times are associated with the higher 
water temperatures, and the reproducibility of the results when correlated as elapsed time 
versus initial water (or brine) temperature was quite remarkable (Enger and 
Hartman,1972a; Enger and Hartman,1972b). Similarly, the Bureau of Mines observed in 
pouring LNG continuously at a rate of 0.45 kg/s onto water that no audible activity was 
encountered during the first 60 seconds. However, after 120 to 180 seconds, audible 
pops were observed about every 30 to 60 seconds for the entire period of 600 seconds 
involved in the continuous spill (Burgess, Murphy, and Zabetakis, 1970). On the other 
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hand, the single, major RPT observed by the Bureau of Mines on their Bruceton pond 
transpired within a fraction of a second after the LNG first contacted the water. It is 
significant to note that this almost instantaneous interaction has not been reproduced in 
experiments except under carefully controlled, unusual conditions as demonstrated by 
Shell. Some idea of the probability of obtaining a substantial RPT can be gleaned from 
the aforementioned Bayou Long tests by Constock. Since 3 or 4 RPTs were noted over a 
period of several months, during which LNG was spilled continuously at rates of 0.23 
m3/min to 0.95 m3/min, it is estimated that on the average one very audible eruption was 
encountered for every 950 m3 spilled.  
 
6.1.4. RPT Conditions and Mechanism 
The composition of spilled hydrocarbons has great effect on the occurrence of 
RPT. As reviewed by the LNG Research Center, MIT (1977), previous studies by Esso 
Research Laboratories have shown that LNG with a high methane content (> 40%) does 
not undergo a RPT when spilled on ambient water. Natural gas typically consists of at 
least 80% methane, and LNG is usually over 90% methane. It may contain other 
hydrocarbon gases (e.g., propane) and nitrogen. This may explain why large scale LNG 
RPT have not been reported. In no case did a RPT occur when the methane 
concentration was greater than 40%. Methane need not be present for a RPT to take 
place.  
    On the other hand, Esso Research Laboratories were able to obtain RPT in quite 
small scale spills of LNG on hot water with initial methane concentrations in excess of 
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50%. After spillage, there was 4 to 15 seconds of film boiling before the occurrence of 
RPT, which was, therefore, sufficient time to boil off much of the methane as the 
original thickness of the LNG layer was only 2-4 mm (LNG Research Center, MIT, 
1977) 
    Shell Pipeline also concluded from their experiments that RPT from LNG spilled 
onto open water at ambient temperature can only occur if the methane content of the 
LNG is less than 40 mole% (Enger and Hartman, 1972b). Furthermore, RPT will not 
occur if the mole ratio of propane to ethane in the LNG is 1.3 or greater.  
LNG can eventually age in a storage tank, by boiling off methane, to reach the 
composition required to produce a RPT on ambient water. In the Maplin Sands tests, 
Blackmore et al. believe that operational delays encountered in this particular test 
allowed the LNG to age sufficiently for RPT to occur (Blackmore, Eyre, and Summers, 
1982). However, if the initial methane content is 95 mole%, for example, only 10% of 
the initial volume of the liquid will remain when the LNG has aged to the critical 
composition. At this time the normal boiling point of the liquid remaining will be –148 
°C or higher, about 13°C hotter than normal LNG.  
    Temperature is another important factor for RPT. Enger and Hartman (1972a) 
noted that the water had to have an initial temperature between 54 °C and 70 °C for RPT 
to occur when liquid propane was spilled on water. In the tests conducted by the LNG 
Research Center, MIT, various hydrocarbons were spilled onto different host liquids. It 
was also noted that the temperature of host liquid must fall within a certain range on 
RPT occurrence (LNG Research Center, MIT, 1977). For example, when 2-
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Methylpropane was spilled onto the ethylene glycol/water mixture, RPT occurred only 
when the substrate temperature is from 101 °C to 106 °C, with violent boil noted from 
97 °C to 100 °C and film boil observed from 108 °C to 115 °C.  
    The requirement for weathering directs suspicion on the heavier hydrocarbons 
which are usually present in LNG. It is further reinforced by the fact that no RPT has, as 
yet, been reported with pure liquid methane on water. Nevertheless, it does not 
necessarily follow that pure liquid methane (or other pure liquids, for that matter) will 
not have RPT when dumped on liquids having an appropriate temperature difference 
across the interface.  
    The amount of LNG spillage has a minor effect on RPT occurrence. During the 
experiments conducted by the LNG Research Center, MIT (1977), no RPT was observed 
when very small amounts of LNG were spilled on hexane, while when 10-100 ml of 
LNG was spilled on hexane, RPT occurred.  
    Esso research laboratories also found in their several experiments, in which LNG 
was spilled on hexane films on water, that the amount of LNG required to obtain RPT on 
a 1.5 cm film was 4 l (LNG Research Center, MIT, 1977).  
    Impact force may be another minor factor for this phenomenon. Porteous and 
Reid (1976) pointed that impacting the cold, volatile liquid upon the hot liquid may lead 
to very destructive RPT or to RPT that would not have occurred if the liquids were 
contacted in a gentler fashion.  
    While there are considerable variations in both the spilled liquid and the host 
liquid, all RPTs seem to have at least one common characteristic, that is, RPT occurs 
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only when the substrate temperature reaches between that necessary to give film boiling 
and that in nucleate boiling. This is based on visual observations of the boiling 
phenomena. Not only is the substrate temperature important, but also its melting point. 
In 1973, Yang (1973) reported the results of spills of LNG onto various organic liquids, 
that is, the hydrocarbon substrates, and his work was addressed by LNG Research Center, 
MIT (1977). It was found in Yang’s tests that, with a few exceptions, RPT occurred with 
organics which had melting points below –51 °C. Substrates that have high melting 
points can freeze almost as soon as LNG is poured on them. A frozen surface provides 
nucleation sites which prevent RPT.  
    A generally accepted explanation for RPT mechanism was proposed by Katz and 
Sliepcevich (1971). The essence of their explanation is that RPT results from 
superheating of LNG. Using the literature on pool boiling and superheating of liquids, 
they have qualitatively explained many of the observed phenomena surrounding LNG-
water reactions. Take the delayed RPT as an example. Here the composition of the 
hydrocarbon is such that when it reaches the water, it is in film boiling. Boiling changes 
the composition of the hydrocarbon as with the platelets so that the temperature rises and 
the temperature difference between the water and the hydrocarbon decreases. After 
boiling for a period of time, the temperature difference due to the changing hydrocarbon 
temperature reaches the Leidenfrost Point and enters the liquid-liquid superheat 
temperature difference region where without any phase change, the liquid film reaches 
the limit of superheat and RPT occurs. Katz (1972) gave a figure to describe this process. 
A similar explanation was given by LNG Research Center, MIT (1977). 
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6.1.5. RPT Models 
    Some fundamental aspects of heat transfer and nucleation characteristics in 
liquid-liquid systems were discussed by Fauske (1974) in an attempt to predict RPT. 
Rausch and Levine carried out the analysis using a geometric thermodynamic model to 
predict RPT. The physical basis of the model is that a second order phase transition takes 
place when a system passes through a critical region. In passing through a critical region, 
thermodynamic stability conditions are violated. The critical region marks the point of 
separation between definite stability and definite instability and consequently a second 
order phase transition may be looked upon as corresponding to incipient instability 
(Rausch and Levine, 1973).   
    Atallah (1997) reviewed several RPT models, including McRae’s analysis of four 
models for cryogen-water RPT, with respect to a possible application in explaining the 
China Lake results. Atallah (1997) pointed out that a numerical solution to the transient 
heat equation is necessary for small volumes of cryogen. However, calculation of 
transient superheating of a drop composed of a mixture of cryogens of different 
volatilities must include species mass transport. Evaporation of the more volatile species 
will result in surface enrichment of the less volatile species, if the diffusion rates are 
slower than the evaporation rates, but no experiment or calculation using the surface 
enrichment effect has been carried out for LNG-water mixtures. LNG-water mixing code 
and RPT propagation code were compiled by Gaz de France to provide an insight into 
the possible hazards presented by RPT events and a quantified estimation, expressed in 
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terms of TNT equivalence, of the associated risks (Nedelka, Sauter, Goanvic, and Ohba, 
2003). 
    As proposed in reports by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
(2004) and ABS Consulting Inc. (ABS, 2004), the modeling of RPT could be helpful in 
two aspects: (1) understanding overpressures resulting from the RPT and (2) 
understanding dispersion of the “puff” of LNG expelled into the atmosphere by the RPT. 
The sizes of the overpressure events have been generally small, and it is not expected to 
cause significant damage to an LNG vessel. However, RPT may increase the rate of 
LNG pool spreading and the LNG vaporization rate. No theoretical or experimental basis 
could be identified for modeling either the overpressure or source term effects.    A 
possible example dispersion analysis was performed to examine the importance of an 
RPT in estimating downwind flammable concentrations. The ABS analysis results 
indicated that the total evaporation duration time will decrease significantly (due to 
bigger pool contact area), but the downwind distance to LFL will increase only slightly.  
    Sandia (2004) reviewed several theoretical models that have been proposed to 
explain the formation of RPT, and it was postulated that much different behavior may 
occur at larger scales, which could not be predicted from smaller scale studies. It was 
concluded that the impacts of RPT will be localized near the spill source and should not 
cause extensive structural damage. 
    The consortium of BG, Gaz de France and the University of Trondheim have not 
yet released the commercial version of a computer program, called CRYO-CULDESAC, 
which purports to model the RPT phenomena. 
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6.1.6. Damage Assessment  
6.1.6.1. Uncertainty of RPT Magnitude Estimation by Sound Waves 
    The RPT occurred in one of those series of tests conducted by the U. S. Bureau 
of Mines. The magnitude was comparable to the explosion of a stick of dynamite 
according to one of the observers standing onshore. However, this estimation of the 
magnitude of the blast should be viewed with suspicion since the loudness of an 
explosion is a very unreliable measure of its absolute intensity. As explained by Cook 
(1958), if two sound waves of a single and equal frequency are compared, the loudness 
varies somewhat as a function of the intensity level. On the other hand, noise, such as 
that produced by RPT, possesses a continuum of frequencies, and the loudness sensation 
from such waves will not be related directly to the intensity level since the ear is a 
nonlinear instrument, the response of which varies with frequency. Furthermore, 
estimates of the absolute intensity of sound by audible means are at best subjective since 
they are strongly influenced by the observer’s frame of mind. Finally, it is well known 
that in the range beyond the damage limits, air blasts, while non-destructive, are 
observed to be extremely variable and depend critically on meteorological conditions 
(Cook, 1958). The fact that an LNG spill on water generates its own localized inversion 
layer, which is enhanced by low wind conditions, will tend to amplify the loudness and 
sharpness of the noise at some distance from the RPT source.  
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6.1.6.2. Damage Potential Estimation 
    The damage at any particular distance from a TNT explosion source can be 
estimated from the maximum overpressure at that point. The maximum overpressure can 
be calculated from the following empirical Equation (6.1) as addressed by Genco and 
Lemmon (1970). The cylindrical explosive charge of TNT is assumed in this empirical 
equation as analyzed by Lipsett (1966): 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−=Δ 320 192109.18534.11 ZZZPPm                      (6.1) 
where                  
mPΔ = maximum overpressure, Psig 
0P = ambient pressure, Psig 
Z = 
3
1
)/(96.3 WR×  
R = distance from the source, ft 
W = TNT equivalent weight, lb 
 
The assumption of a cylindrical charge in Equation (6.1) gives lower values for 
the maximum overpressure than a rectangular charge. Furthermore, it is questionable to 
what extent this equation is applicable to LNG-water RPT. The best guess at the moment 
is that Equation (6.1) will overestimate the overpressure for an LNG-water RPT since it 
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originates near the surface of the water. Consequently, the shock wave will be attenuated 
at the air-water interface and most of it will be directed upwards.  
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Figure 6.1. Damage potentials. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 was generated from Equation (6.1). It shows the variation of peak 
overpressure with distance for several TNT equivalent weight parameters. Figure 6.2 is a 
cross-plot of Figure 6.1 and is somewhat more convenient for damage estimation. From 
Figure 6.2 it is evident that 4.5 kg of TNT (equivalent to 20 sticks of dynamite) would 
not puncture a ship’s hull at a distance of 2.7 meter. These assigned distances are 
roughly what might be encountered in LNG tanker unloading practice.  
 127
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100
TNT Equivalent Weight, kg
D
ic
ta
nc
e 
fr
om
 S
ou
rc
e,
 m
et
er 152 bar - Puncture
Ship's Outer Hull 
0.69 bar - Moderate
Damage to
Reinforced Concrete 
0.034 bar - Shatter
Windows
 
 
Figure 6.2. Damage potentials: cross-plot. 
 
The highest overpressure recorded in the Shell large-scale spill tests was 14 
kg/cm2 (13.8 bar) at a distance of one meter below the liquid-liquid interface (Enger and 
Hartman, 1972a). From Figure 6.1 this overpressure and distance would classify the 
explosion as equivalent to about 0.91 kg of TNT. An LNG-water RPT of this magnitude 
would have to be less than 1 foot from a ship’s hull to cause even minor damage to the 
hull structure. In this case the damage due to low temperature embrittlement by direct 
contact of the LNG with the hull would be a more serious threat than any LNG-water 
RPT. 
    Notice that TNT equivalent weight estimation of an explosion from peak 
overpressure-distance data is extremely sensitive to the distance measurement. Due to 
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surface penetration of the falling liquid, the distance between the explosion source and 
the pressure transducer in the Shell tests may be less than 1 meter. If the actual distance 
was 0.057 meter, the TNT equivalent of their largest blast is reduced to 0.045 kg of TNT. 
It should be emphasized that the majority of RPTs observed by Shell resulted in smaller 
maximum overpressures, further decreasing the chance of damage due to an LNG spill 
on water. 
 
6.1.7. RPT Explosion Energy Release 
    As noted previously herein, estimates of energy release based on sound are very 
unreliable indicators. The available experimental data about RPT explosion energy 
release are shown in Table 6.1, and only those data recorded by sensors are illustrated in 
the Table. Experimental data on blast pressures for LNG-water RPT are not in abundant 
supply, and some overpressure data were not clearly noted in the reference. In Table 6.1 
the TNT equivalents are derived from Figure 6.1 or Equation (6.1) on the basis of 
measured overpressures at known distances from the spill points. 
The largest overpressure recorded by Conoco was 24.8 bar at about 0.15 meter 
from RPT source. This is estimated to be equivalent to 0.0045 kg of TNT. In one series 
of tests, a plexiglass container was destroyed by RPT and one 0.0026 m2 remnant was 
found 42.7 meter from the point of detonation. By calculation of the force required to 
hurl this piece of plexiglass, an estimate of the peak overpressure can be made. The 
calculated value was 26.6 bar. The important point is that this value provides an 
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independent check on the order-of-magnitude of the data recorded by the pressure 
transducers.  
 
Table 6.1  
Summary of RPT explosion energy release*  
Test 
Spill 
Size 
Maximum RPT 
Overpressure vs. 
Distance to source 
TNT Equivalence 
U. S. Bureau of Mines 6 liters 4.1 bar at 0.076 m < 0.0045 kg  
Conoco a / 24.8 bar at 0.015 m 0.0045 kg 
University of Maryland b 200 ml 28.4 bar ≅ 0.0045 kg 
MIT 350 ml 13.8 bar at 0.1 m < 0.0045 kg 
Shell a  / 13.8 bar at 1 m 0.91 kg 
Burro Tests 24 m3 0.05 bar at 30 m 3.5 kg 
Coyote Tests 28 m3 0.09 bar at 24.3 m 3.0 kg 
 
* Overpressure data that could not be validated according to the measured overpressure 
gauge and the corresponding distance to source are not included in this table, including 
that from Gaz de France.  
 
a The corresponding spill size was not clearly noted.  
b The distance to measure the overpressure was not specified clearly in the reference; it 
was stated that “a miniature pressure transducer was fixed above the surface of the liquid 
sample”. A distance of 0.15 meter from the source is assumed to assess the 
corresponding TNT equivalence.   
 
    
6.1.8. Scale-up 
    The TNT equivalent of a large spill cannot be estimated simply by a linear 
scaling of the volumes of the small scale spills for which RPT has been observed. The 
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LNG-water explosion is highly dependent on the amount of liquid-liquid contact area, 
which is available for heat transfer. This heat transfer area does not increase in direct 
proportion to LNG spill volume. Burgess, Biordi, and Murphy (1972) developed 
equations for predicting the spreading rate of LNG on water. These equations can be 
used to show that the possible heat transfer contact area is relatively limited even for 
large spills. Another aspect of increased heat transfer contact area is the time required for 
the larger spill to reach this available surface area. It seems reasonable that a number of 
distinct RPTs at various times would be more likely in a large spill than one large 
simultaneous release. The fact that larger spills require larger distributions over time and 
space reinforce the probability of multiple weak RPT.  
    Timing and spatial configuration of any explosive source are critically important 
parameters. Explosive demolition of urban buildings takes advantage of these factors. 
Using a timed sequence of distributed explosions, a building can be razed without 
damage to neighboring facilities. If, however, the same amount of explosive were 
detonated at the same time and in one location, the resultant overpressure could do 
extensive damage to surrounding property.  
    The following Equation (6.2) provides a method for estimating the distributed 
effect of TNT explosions:  
4
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
N
d
NWW ρρ                                                           (6.2)  
where                
W  = actual TNT equivalent weight 
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NW = normal density TNT equivalent of the dispersed explosive 
dρ = density of the dispersed explosive 
Nρ = normal density of the explosive 
    Compare the explosive power of 0.45 kg of TNT distributed over 2.83 m3 with 
the same 0.45 kg of TNT concentrated at the center of this explosive volume. The 
normal density of TNT is about 1603 kg/m3. The density of the distributed explosive is 
0.16 kg/m3. Equation (6.3) shows that: 
( ) lbsW 1.0
100
01.00.1
25.0
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=   (6.3) 
 
    One lb of TNT, that is 0.45 kg of TNT, distributed over 2.8 m3 is equivalent in 
damage potential to 0.045 kg of TNT concentrated at the center of the explosive volume. 
This result is in line with observed behavior; damage done by a distributed source is 
always less than an equivalent amount of explosive concentrated at one point.  
 
6.1.9. RPT Impact on LNG Leak Contacting Ship Ballast 
    No studies have addressed the potential for damage from an RPT which results 
from the leak of LNG upon contact with the ballast water. Most comments on this 
subject have assumed that only a small leak would occur, with the resulting RPT 
assumed to be very minor. RPT following a major terrorism event has been dismissed as 
irrelevant considering the major impact of an intentional LNG sabotage scenario. 
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6.1.10. Varied Opinion in RPT Reported Incidents: Badak, Indonesia, December 1992 
6.1.10.1. Quoting Directly from an Paper 
   The following is quoted directly from the paper of Nedelka, Sauter, Goanvic, and 
Ohba (2003). 
“An LNG leak occurred when starting a liquefaction train, and the decision was 
made to operate the train despite the leak. Protective water curtains were used to reduce 
the effects of the vapor cloud produced. Approximately 11 hours after the plant was 
started, RPTs occurred in a drainage channel covered by a concrete slab. The drainage 
channel and concrete slab were broken, adjacent pipe was damaged, and some concrete 
blocks were thrown approximately 100 m. No personnel were injured because the area 
had been evacuated because of the leak.” This simplified quote has many erroneous 
statements 
 
6.1.10.2. Quoting from an Eyewitness  
    The rundown line from Train E had a stub with a valve and blind flange installed 
for the future tie in of Train F. The incident in question occurred when the valve that had 
been repaired was ready for re-installation prior to the tie in being made for Train F. the 
maintenance crew prepared to remove the blind flange and re-install the valve. Because 
of the existence of some residual LNG in the LNG rundown line, a small amount of 
liquid started to come out the bottom of the flange when the flange was spread. The 
leaking LNG was channeled to an area where there was a closed storm water drain that 
fed into a central closed storm water drain that ran down the center of the process area. It 
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was here that the RPT occurred due to there being a significant amount of water in the 
drain and then the LNG coming into contact with this water and rapidly vaporizing 
causing the 30" drain pipe to lift out of the ground. The actual explosion occurred 
underground and not in the open storm water sewer system (Harris, et. al., 1992) 
 
6.1.10.3. Quoting Directly from Bontang Safety Manager  
The following is quoted directly from John Boone, the Bontang safety manager.  
“Some people believe that the damage was caused by the RPT phenomena, but 
many others later realized that the over-pressurization of closed drains (which did not 
have any pressure relief) could also be an explanation. There were many local RPTs on 
the surface, which made the observers focus on the RPT explanation.” Figure 6.3 
provides a visual sketch of the situation. 
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Figure 6.3. Badak, Indonesia incident, December 1992: was it RPT or unrelieved overpressure? 
(Based on Harris, et. al., 1992) 
 
 
 
6.1.11. Conclusion on RPT 
Experimental and theoretical studies that have been carried out about LNG – 
water RPT are review. Even though RPT is a rare occurrence as shown by the 
experiments reviewed in this article, it did occur when some conditions were fulfilled.  
The effects for RPT have been explored based on early studies, and the well-accepted 
vapor mechanism has been described. Such understanding is beneficial for LNG tanker 
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transportation since the possibility of RPT occurrence could be reduced by avoiding 
those conditions that favor RPT.   
It has been emphasized that larger LNG spills will not likely constitute a 
significantly larger damage potential than what has already been observed in the 
experimental tests by various investigators, although scale factors for LNG-water RPT 
cannot be developed without further experimental work and mathematical modeling. In 
the early LNG industry development, a concern that RPT could initiate an Unconfined 
Vapor Cloud Explosion prompted many of the tests that are reported herein. However, 
the potential for UVCE has been proved to be not feasible. 
Out of all the many RPT tests, the Falcon 5 test shows a unique anomaly. It 
appears that an RPT may have been the ignition source of the downwind vapor. While 
that was a very unique event, it indicates that downwind vapor dispersion of a large 
LNG spill on water has an even smaller likelihood due to the potential for RPT based 
ignition. 
Some theoretical models have been developed to predict the maximum 
overpressure resulting from RPT, but much more data on RPT with better pressure and 
distance measurements would be required to provide input for eventual model validation.  
 
6.2. Assessment of Variables’ Effect on Consequences of LNG Spillage onto Water  
In this section we will focus on the flammable vapor clouds dispersion process. 
The related processes, including LNG spillage and pool spread and evaporation, will 
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also be considered. The effects of tank conditions, release scenarios and environmental 
conditions on the LNG spillage, spread and dispersion processes will be evaluated.  
 
6.2.1. Background 
6.2.1.1. Experimental Test about LNG Spillage onto Water 
Quantitative data began to emerge from the Lake Charles experimental project in 
the 1950s. In 1968 and 1969, the U. S. Bureau of Mines Safety Research Center at 
Pittsburgh conducted LNG spill tests up to about 16.6 ft3 (0.47 m3) on a quiescent pond 
(Burgess, Murphy, and Zabetakis, 1970; Burgess, Biordi, and Murphy, 1972). Esso 
Research and Engineering Company carried out LNG spillage on water testS to obtain 
the downwind dispersion data characteristics of a marine environment (Feldbauer, et. al., 
1972). Most of the tests were conducted at two sizes—about 250 gallons and about 2500 
gallons. In 1980 Maplin Sands tests, involving spilling quantities of refrigerated gas of 
up to 20 m3, were performed by the National Maritime Institute and were sponsored by 
Shell to obtain dispersion and thermal radiation data (Blackmore, Eyre and Summers, 
1982). The Burro tests were conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
and the Naval Weapons Center in 1980 (Koopman, et. al., 1982). A total of nine LNG 
releases onto water were performed, with spill volumes ranging from 24 to 39 m3. In 
1987, the Falcon tests were conducted in Nevada to provide a database on LNG vapor 
dispersion from spills involving obstacles and to assess the effectiveness of vapor fences 
for mitigating dispersion hazards (Shin, Meroney, and Neff , 1991). The highest spillage 
volume during the tests was 66.4 m3.  
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6.2.1.2. LNG Source Term Calculations 
Fay (2003) presented two models to assess the LNG release processes from the 
cargo tank ruptures, one for scenarios with holes above the seawater level, and the other 
for scenarios with holes below seawater level. Further analysis in his paper was based 
only on the former model. 
In May 2004, under the contract with the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), ABS Consulting Inc. developed consequence assessment methods 
for incidents involving releases from LNG carriers (ABS, 2004). FERC (2004) updated 
the ABS report in June 2004. An orifice model was used in ABS/FERC report to 
evaluate the rate of LNG release from the tank. Currently almost all authors use the 
orifice model, but variations exist in assumed initial conditions and orifice coefficient. 
 
6.2.1.3. LNG Vaporization Rate on Water 
LNG vapor generation is calculated based on the heat transferred from the water 
into the spilled LNG pool. In the model developed by Otterman (1975), which is the 
most widely accepted LNG evaporation model, the vaporization rate of 0.04 lb ft-2 s-1 
(that is about 0.20 kg m-2 s-1) was based upon the experimental data from the Bureau of 
Mines. Sometimes vaporization rates were reported as thickness regression rates, with a 
typical value of 1 inch per minute. Opschoor (1980) derived an evaporation rate of 0.01 
lb ft-2 s-1 (0.05 kg m-2 s-1) from the convective heat flux equations. However, FERC 
(2004) recommended using the value of 0.034 lb ft-2 s-1 (0.17 kg m-2 s-1), which 
 138
corresponds to a heat flux of about 26,954 BTU hr-1 ft-2 (85 kW/m2). This value was 
obtained during the Burro tests.  
 
6.2.1.4. LNG Pool Spread on Water 
Early spread models were based on the steady state Bernoulli equation and axi-
symmetric spread on water (Enger and Hartman, 1972a; Gideon and Putnam, 1977). 
With this approach, spread is driven strictly by gravity, and the rate is given as a 
function of pool height only. Raj and Kalelkar (1973) derived a different spreading 
relationship by equating gravitational force and inertial resisting force. Otterman (1975) 
derived the spread model based on the oil spill experiment data, and concluded that those 
three methodologies yield almost identical predictions for the maximum pool radius. 
Bosch and Weterings (1997) employed a method based on self-similar solutions 
of the shallow water equations and lubrication theory. This method is called Webber’s 
method. This approach accounts for the resistance to spreading as a result of turbulent or 
laminar friction. Because Webber’s method has a much sound theoretical basis and 
accounts for friction effects, a majority of researchers believe that it is more realistic 
than other simpler models that ignore friction effects; thus, FERC recommended using 
Webber method. 
Although wave action is expected to affect both the shape and rate of spread of 
LNG on water, little effort has been expended in defining this relationship. Quest (2003) 
has made some initial attempts to quantify this effect, but the lack of experimental data 
has made validation difficult. 
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6.2.1.5. Flammable Vapor Dispersion 
Modeling of flash fires is primarily a matter of applying a dispersion model. The 
most well known codes to model LNG dense gas dispersion are FEM3, SLAB, 
HEGADAS and DEGADIS. FEM3 is based on Navier-Stokes, and the model 
computationally solves time-averaged, three-dimensional, turbulent transport equations 
that come from conservation of mass, species, momentum and energy balances. The 
other three models, SLAB, HAGADAS and DEGADIS, are one-dimensional integral 
models, and they use similar profiles that assume a specific shape for the crosswind 
profile of concentration and other properties. The downwind variation of spatially 
averaged crosswind values is determined by using the conservation equations in the 
downwind direction only.  
In 1992, the American Gas Association, under provisions of 49 CFR 193, 
petitioned the Department of Transportation to specify the use of DEGADIS for 
calculation of the gas dispersion protection zones in the regulation. FERC also 
recommended using DEGADIS to model the LNG vapor cloud dispersion process.  
 
6.2.2. Hazard Assessment Methodology 
6.2.2.1. FERC Models for Assessing LNG Carrier Spills on Water  
The orifice model was employed by FERC (2004) to assess the LNG release 
process. This model calculates the flow from a circular hole in the side of a cargo tank 
that allows the LNG to flow directly from the tank into the water, using the following 
equation: 
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gHRCQ ld 2
2πρ=                                                     (6.4) 
where                                                                      
Q = mass flow rate, lb s-1 
dC = discharge or orifice coefficient  
lρ = density of LNG, lb f-3 
R = radius of hull breach, ft 
H = static head above hull breach, ft 
g = gravitational acceleration, 32.2 ft s-2 
 
It is worthwhile to note that static head consists of both the liquid height and the 
ullage pressure. For the fixed volume release from a cargo tank, the flow rate will drop 
as the liquid level above the breach drops. The discharge orifice coefficient is assumed 
to be 0.65 as recommended by FERC. 
As described in the background, Webber’s method was recommended by FERC 
to model the LNG pool spread. A value of 85 kW/m2 for heat flux was adopted by FERC. 
The DEGADIS model was employed by FERC to assess the vapor dispersion process. 
For flash fires, the level of concern is typically defined as the Low Flammability Limit 
(LFL) for the substance. The downwind distance to LFL and the time to reach LFL were 
derived from the DEGADIS model.  
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6.2.2.2. FERC Scenario for Cargo Tank Vapor Dispersion 
The base scenario modeled by FERC is:  
• LNG properties: 
LNG composition: Methane  
LNG density: 422.5kg m-3 (26.38 lb ft-3) 
• Release scenario: 
Volume of vessel: 883,000 ft3 (25,000 m3) 
Percent of cargo tank volume spilled: 50% 
Total spill quantity: 441,500 ft3 (12,500 m3) 
Hole diameter: 3.3 ft (1 m) 
Initial liquid height above hole: 43 ft (13 m) 
Pool shape: semi-circular 
• Environmental conditions:  
Air temperature: 71 °F (22 °C) 
Relative humidity: 70% 
Wind speed: 6.7 mph (3.0 m s-1) and 4.5 mph (2.0 m s-1) 
Pasquill-Turner stability class: D and F 
Surface roughness: 0.03 ft (0.01 m) 
Averaging time: 1 min 
• Heat transfer parameters: 
Heat transfer parameters: 
Film boiling heat flux to pool: 26,900 BTU hr-1 ft-2 (85 kW/m2) 
 142
Evaporation mass flux: 0.034 lb ft-2 s-1 (0.17 kg m-2 s-1) 
 
The results of LNG pool spreading and vapor dispersion for the above scenario 
were reported by FERC as shown in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 
 Computed results using FERC methodology for LNG release base scenario 
PARAMETERS FERC RESULTS 
Initial spill rate 7,600 lb/s  (3,400 kg/s) 
Total spill duration 51 min 
Maximum pool radius 418 ft (127 m) 
Wind speed and stability class 6.7 mph (3.0 m/s) and D stability 
Downwind distance to LFL 6,500 ft (2,000 m) 
Time LFL reaches maximum distance 16 min 
Wind speed and stability class 4.5 mph (2.0 m/s) and F stability 
Downwind distance to LFL 11,000 ft (3,400 m) 
Time LFL reaches maximum distance 29 min 
 
 
6.2.2.3. WinFERC Model for Scenario Assumptions Sensitivity Analysis 
The FERC/ABS spill/spread models are employed in this paper to analyze the 
sensitivity of scenario assumptions to the LNG hazard assessment (Qiao, West, Mannan, 
Johnson, and Cornwell, 2006). A Fortran program was developed to compute the spill 
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and spread of LNG on water and to produce a suitable input file for use with the 
DEGADIS vapor dispersion model. The Fortran program was carefully tested against the 
results produced by the MathCad version of the FERC/ABS report. This model, which 
will be referred to as WinFERC, was used to perform the portions of the parametric 
study dealing with the spill and spread of LNG on water. The WinFERC interface is 
shown in Figure 6.4.  
 
                  
 
Figure 6.4. WinFERC model interface. 
 
 
The vapor dispersion process is then modeled by DEGADIS model, with the data 
provided by WinFERC as input to DEGADIS.  
The effects of different scenario assumption variables on the LNG hazard 
assessment results, especially the hazardous vapor cloud dispersion, are analyzed by 
using WinFERC and DEGADIS models. Those affecting variables include breach 
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diameter, ullage pressure, weather conditions and surface roughness. The base scenario 
to model in this paper is the same as the FERC scenario as described earlier. During the 
sensitivity analysis processes, almost all the variables will be the same as those in the 
base FERC scenario, and change is only allowed for the variable that is under sensitivity 
analysis, or unless specified.  
 
6.2.3. Sensitivity of Scenario Assumptions to the LNG Hazard Assessment 
6.2.3.1 Breach Diameter 
  The results shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate the effects of breach diameter 
on the release results, including the time to empty vessel and pool size. The time to 
empty vessel decreases dramatically with the increase of hole diameter as shown in 
figure 6.5. In figure 6.6, initially the LNG pool radius increases in correlation with 
increases in the breach diameter, but the pool radius reaches an asymptotic value when 
the breach diameter is larger than 5 m.   
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 also show the effect of breach diameter on the LNG vapor 
dispersion process at two sets of atmospheric conditions. The distance to reach LFL 
follows a similar curve as the LNG pool radius.  
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Figure 6.5. Time to empty vessel vs. hole diameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. LNG pool radius vs. hole diameter. 
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Figure 6.7. LNG vapor dispersion results at 5m/s wind speed and D stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8. LNG vapor dispersion results at 2m/s wind speed and F stability. 
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6.2.3.2. Wind Stability Class and Wind Speed 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate that the LFL downwind distance is increased when 
the wind stability class changes from D to F and the wind speed decreases from 5 m s-1 
to 2 m s-1. When the wind stability class transforms from neutral class D to moderately 
stable class F, the atmosphere turbulence tends to be weak, so that the LFL downwind 
distance increases. The decrease of wind speed also diminishes the turbulence level to 
some degree, so the LFL downwind distance will be increased. The difference in Figure 
6.7 and 6.8 presents the combined effects of wind stability and speed on the LNG vapor 
dispersion process. It is interesting to note that, although the distances to the LFL at 
small breach diameters are different, the LFL distances for breach diameters above five 
meters are similar. 
 
6.2.3.3. Cargo Tank Ullage Pressure 
 The cargo tank ullage pressure in an LNG tanker is usually less than 2 psig. For 
sensitivity assessment purpose, the maximum ullage pressure considered here is 4 psig. 
According to Equation (6.4), the spill rate is proportional to the square root of static head 
above the breach, thus the time to empty vessel would be decreased with an increase of 
ullage pressure, as shown in Figure 6.9. Figure 6.10 illustrates that the pool radius is 
enlarged with the increase of ullage pressure. The vapor dispersion process is also 
influenced by the change of ullage pressure. As shown in Figure 6.11, when the hole 
diameter is 1 m, the LFL downwind distance is increased as the ullage pressure is 
increased from 0 psig to 2 psig, but LFL downwind distance is not strongly affected 
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when ullage pressure is higher than 2 psig. For LNG released from 5 m diameter hole, 
the LFL downwind distance remains constant with the increase of ullage pressure. 
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Figure 6.9.  Time to empty vessel for spilled LNG vs. ullage pressure. 
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Figure 6.10. LNG pool radius vs. ullage pressure. 
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Figure 6.11. LNG vapor dispersion vs. ullage pressure. 
 
 
6.2.3.4. Surface Roughness 
Figure 6.12 illustrates the effect of surface roughness on the dispersion. When 
the surface roughness is high, the LFL downwind distance is decreased with the increase 
of surface roughness. However, when the surface roughness is less than 0.003 m, there is 
little change in the distance to reach the LFL. We could expect that the increase in 
surface roughness would increase the degree of atmospheric turbulence near grade, 
which would decrease the downwind extent of vapor clouds that would form and 
disperse near grade. Such kind of influence is similar to that of atmospheric stability. 
Based on the DEGADIS model calculations, the initial gravity that induced spreading of 
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the heavy LNG vapors might overwhelm the changes in surface roughness below a 
roughness level of 0.003 m. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Effect of surface roughness on dispersion distances. 
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to determine the effect of tank configuration on the spillage process. The implicit tank 
configuration in most consequence analysis software is cylinder or square, with a 
constant cross sectional area. The spill of LNG from a spherical tank can not be assessed 
by this kind of software. The commercial program MatLab was used to compare the 
spillage difference for a membrane square tank and a Moss spherical tank.  
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The typical modern size of LNG vessels is 135,000 m3 in 4-6 cargo tanks, so here 
a cargo tank volume of 25,000 m3 is assumed. The diameter is 36.28 m for a Moss 
spherical tank, and the height is 29.24 m for a membrane square tank. The breach is 
assumed to be 30% from the bottom of each tank, resulting in an initial liquid level of 
10.88 m above tank bottom for a spherical tank and 8.77 m for a square tank. So the 
initial liquid height above breach hole is 25.4 m for a spherical tank and 20.47 m for a 
square tank. By running the MatLab program, the spill rates versus time for these two 
kinds of tanks are modeled, and the results are shown as Figure 6.13. 
The initial spill rate is higher for a spherical tank because of its higher static head 
above hull breach. The spill process is determined by the tank geometry. The spill rate 
decreases linearly with time for a square tank, while for a spherical tank, the spill rate 
decreases very quickly at the beginning, and decreases a little slowly after that. 
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Figure 6.13. Spillage rate vs. time for spherical tank and square tank. 
 
 
6.2.4. Discussion  
6.2.4.1. Model Validation against Available Experimental Test Data 
Experimentation has generally been performed on a fairly small scale. The 
largest spillage volume to date was 66.4 m3, which was also the largest scale tested 
during Falcon tests in 1987 (Shin, Meroney, and Neff, 1991). However, the consequence 
models validated with these small scale experimental data are being used for spill 
scenarios of 25,000 m3 and larger. Jones and McGugan (1978) proposed that the 
minimum area required to enable a spill to be scaled up reliably to the dimensions of a 
realistic spill of tens of meters across is 1 m2. The scale up factor of more than 350 to 1 
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(25,000 m3 to 66.4 m3) in LNG spill modeling process has left the scale up process under 
question for its reliability.  
As a number of experiments were performed at small scale and their relevance to 
real-life large spills is uncertain, a reasonable scale up factor needs to be determined and 
evaluated so that it is possible to test models and, subsequently, to permit any necessary 
modification based on the data gathered from a series of carefully controlled 
experiments that are at an adequately large scale.   
 
6.2.4.2. LNG Spillage Process 
It can be seen from Equation (6.4) that the mass flow rate is the direct function of 
the square root of the static head, the area of the breach hole, and the data of discharge 
coefficient.  
A value of 1.0 for the discharge coefficient, which is for ideal frictionless case, is 
not reasonable in the case of a rough, irregular hole that would be expected in a spill 
from an LNG carrier. The International LNG Alliance and the International Gas Union 
suggested a value of 0.65, and the Center for LNG suggested a reasonable, conservative 
estimate of discharge coefficient ranges from 0.6 to 0.8, thus FERC recommended 0.65, 
which can be defended as a reasonable estimate.  
  In this paper, a hole diameter of 1 m is selected as the base release scenario. 
Pitblado, et. al. (2004) at DNV proved that 0.25 m will be a credible hole diameter for a 
puncture type event, the maximum credible hole from accidental operational events will 
be 0.75 m, and 1.5 m from terrorist events. With the hole size changing in a wider range, 
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from 0.5 m to 30 m, Figure 6.6 illustrates that the time to empty the vessel is changed 
linearly with the logarithm of the hole size as determined by Equation (6.4).   
The static head incorporates both the liquid height above the breach and the 
ullage pressure in the tank. The ullage pressure is dependent on the LNG composition 
and cargo tank design, and can vary from about atmospheric pressure to about 2 psig. 
The time to empty the vessel is approximately a linear function of the ullage pressure as 
shown in Figure 6.9. The assumed location of the breach opening will affect the time to 
empty the vessel in the same way, since the breach location will determine the liquid 
height given the fixed tank volume and configuration. Most analysts assume the breach 
occurs at the waterline for modeling purpose.  
The tank configuration is not a direct factor in computing the release rate in 
Equation (6.4), but it does have an effect on the release scenario as shown in Figure 6.13. 
The spill rate can be expressed as: 
dtdhAdtdVQ // ××=×= ρρ  (6.5) 
 
In Equation (6.5) A is uniform for the square tank, while for a spherical tank, A 
is changing during the whole release process. The cross area is so small at the top of the 
spherical tank that the height drops rapidly initially and the spill rate declines quickly at 
the beginning. The cross area in the middle of the tank becomes larger and changes less, 
so the spill rate decline more slowly than the beginning.  
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6.2.4.3. Sensitivity of Pool Spreading Process  
The LNG will spread on the water and continuous evaporation will take place if 
LNG spillage occurs. The LNG pool will continue to spread until the minimum layer 
thickness corresponding to the maximum pool diameter is reached. The vapor 
production will increase during the spreading simply by virtue of the increasing area of 
the evaporating liquid. This will reach a maximum when the pool has reached a size 
corresponding to the equilibrium LNG quantity.  
Otterman (1975) described the spreading process for an axi-symmetric pool 
through the following equation: 
 
[ ] 2112 hgdt
dr Δ=   (6.6) 
Where  
2r
Vh π=  
V = LNG volume on water, ft3 
r = pool radius, ft 
1
1
1 ρ
ρρ −=Δ
 
1ρ = density of water, lb f-3 
ρ = density of LNG, lb f-3 
g = gravitational acceleration, 32.2 ft s-2 
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Through this equation, spread is driven only by gravity and the pool reaches the 
maximum with the pool layer thickness at the minimum. Webber’s method accounts for 
the friction effects, and the maximum pool size should occur when the pool is in the 
minimum thickness and the gravity driven force and the turbulent or laminar resistance 
force are in equilibrium.   
For a long term release, the pool will spread until the evaporation rate matches 
the rate of spillage. Thus the detailed modeling of pool spreading is not necessary. The 
pool area can be estimated from the spill rate divided by the evaporation rate per unit 
area. 
The change of maximum pool size with the hole size in Figure 6.6 can be 
explained by the combined effects of long term release scenario and instantaneous spill 
scenario. When the breach hole diameter is less than 4 m, the LNG spillage can be 
viewed as long term release process. With the hole size becoming larger, the spill rate is 
higher, resulting in a larger pool. When the breach hole diameter is larger than 4 m, the 
spill process can be simplified as instantaneous spill, and the maximum pool size is 
independent of the hole size.    
As illustrated in Figure 6.9, when the tank ullage pressure is less than 4 psig and 
the breach hole diameter is 1 m, the time to empty the vessel declines linearly with the 
ullage pressure. The spill process can be assumed as long term release when tank ullage 
pressure is less than 4 Psig. The increment of the ullage pressure increases the spill rate, 
so the maximum pool size increases with the increasing of ullage pressure accordingly.  
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6.2.4.4. Sensitivity of Vapor Dispersion Process 
Blackmore, Eyre and Summers (1982).found that plume dispersion behavior is 
dependent on source conditions, especially for continuous LNG spills. The results 
illustrated in Figures 6.7 – 6.11 prove that the hole size and ullage pressure affect the 
dispersion process.  
Increasing breach hole size and ullage pressure has similar effects in enlarging 
the spreading pool. A larger pool size means that the overall evaporation rate will 
increase. As the evaporation rate increases, the downwind distance to a given 
concentration increases. When the increase of the spill rate can not enlarge the pool size 
and the subsequent evaporation rate, the downwind distance to LFL will not change any 
more as shown in Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9.    
The wind stability class is an indicator of atmosphere turbulence level. A higher 
turbulence level will increase the dilution of the LNG plume with the air. So the 
downwind distance to LFL will increase when the turbulence level degrades. The 
decreases of the surface roughness and the wind speed have the similar effects on the 
vapor dispersion process. In Maplin Sands tests, liquid propane was continuously 
released from a tank at an average spill rate of 2.3 m3/min. When the win speed is 5.5 
m/s and 3.8 m/s, the observed dispersion distances to LFL were 215 m and 400 m, 
respectively (Blackmore, Eyre and Summers, 1982). The same trend has been found in 
our model results shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
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6.2.5. Conclusions 
When an LNG cargo tank is ruptured, the LNG flows out of the hole onto the 
surface of water, in an amount and at a rate depending on the tank size, dimension, 
location of the rupture and ullage pressure. The spilled fluid spreads on the water surface, 
eventually evaporating entirely, mixing with air and dispersing downwind.  
The FERC modeling algorithms were employed in this paper to analyze the LNG 
spillage consequences. The computed results illustrate that the changes of breach size 
and ullage pressure will change not only the spill duration and pool size, but also the 
dispersion process. Variations of tank configuration affect the spill process. The wind 
stability, wind speed and surface roughness affect the vapor dispersion process for 
breach diameters less than 4 m, but have a smaller effect on spills from breach diameters 
larger than 5 m.  
 159
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
7.1. Conclusions 
This research is aimed at developing a practical and efficient TRA methodology 
to support the operations of HazMat transportation. A quantitative risk assessment 
methodology is provided in this dissertation to measure the risk profile. The basic idea of 
the proposed methodology is to capture the matching of data/databases availability with 
TRA techniques and to set up an applicable framework to assess transportation risk step 
by step.  
Risk components, including incident frequency, release probability, consequence 
scenario, and fatality, are carefully observed to determine their contributing factors and 
to figure out the proper data/databases for analysis. Given the conditions where no 
enough data exist, some mathematical methods including fuzzy logic are employed to 
incorporate human’s linguistic information. Then these components are assessed based 
on the analysis on available data/databases, commercially available software, and expert 
knowledge. Mathematical models and risk analysis techniques like ETA are employed 
for each risk component assessment. 
The measure of the overall risk level considers the interaction between the 
transportation network, the vehicle or traveling risk source, and the impact area. 
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Numerical models are presented to measure individual risk and societal risk caused by 
HazMat transportation.  
By matching the available data with the model set up, the TRA methodology can 
be applied directly in the decision support system to guide the operations of HazMat 
transportation.  
The overall methodology is developed from available data/databases, which 
makes it an applicable and accountable tool in the decision support system to guide the 
operations of HazMat transportation. This generic method could be applied for most of 
TRA within the scopes defined therein. Decision makers could modify the methodology 
when dealing with different HazMat. The methodology could be simplified or elaborated 
further based on the requirement of users.   
 
7.2. Recommendations  
This work is proposed based on the analysis on available data/databases. An 
abundant supply of data/database will facilitate the improvement of accuracy and 
practicality of our methodologies. In recent years, especially after September 11, 2001, 
fewer institutes, agencies, or organization would like to disclose incident data to the 
public, even to our researcher. It is recommended that institutes associated with HazMat 
transportation (e.g., American Petroleum Institute and Chlorine Institute) grant the 
accessibility to transportation incident databases, so that the changes in HazMat 
transportation in recent years could be tracked, and TRA methodology can be proposed 
with a solid background.  
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GIS has proved to be helpful in TRA. Many environmental features necessary for 
TRA are attainable in GIS, but some important features may not be there. For example, 
the number of highway lanes, which is critical to the risk measurement, could not be 
found in GIS. It also happens to wind direction probability and other parameters. More 
effort could be devoted to collecting data on crucial parameter outside of GIS and 
merging that information with GIS. By this way, all the environmental information 
needed for TRA can be pulled out directly from GIS, and the TRA process will be more 
efficient.  
Our methodology is developed to assess the transportation risk over a year. 
However, the risk for any certain given transportation scenario should be analyzed to 
take account of the effect of time varying parameters. Our model for incident frequency 
assessment has considered the time varying parameters like weather and driver 
experience. More work needs to be performed to assess other risk components taking 
into consideration the effect of time varying parameters. 
If more incident data are accessible, e.g., transportation institutes of all states 
could standardize their data collection and provide the incident data on more highways, a 
global model could be built in the similar way as presented in this dissertation. A user 
friendly computer program could then be compiled. By coupling this model with a more 
powerful GIS, the risk associated with any route could be easily assessed.   
In our optimum routing models, it has been proved that TRA is important in 
guiding the route selections of HazMat transportation. Transportation decision support 
system is a complex system. More actions could be facilitated by utilizing TRA results. 
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Further research is recommended to explore the application of TRA in emergency 
response and other actions made in decision support system to mitigate transportation 
hazard and ensure a safer environment.  
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